Essays in social learning by Zhang, Min
London School of Economics and Political Science
Essays in Social Learning
Min Zhang
A thesis submitted to the Department of Economics of the London School
of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, June 2015.
Declaration
I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree
of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other
than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent
of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identied in it).
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted,
provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without
my prior written consent.
I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights
of any third party.
I declare that my thesis consists of 29; 047 words.
London, 22 June 2015
Min Zhang
1
Statement of Conjoint Work
I conrm that Chapter 3, Learning and Price Dynamics in Durable Goods Markets,
was jointly co-authored with Mr Francesco Palazzo. I contributed a minimum of 50% of
this work.
General decisions about the directions of research, and the proofs of the main results,
were made equally between the authors.
Francesco Palazzo Min Zhang
2
Acknowledgements
I am deeply indebted to my supervisor Erik Eyster for his consistent inspiration and
encouragement throughout the course of my PhD. I benet so much from many long and
fruitful discussions with Erik; he helps me transform from a graduate student to a proper
economist. I would also like to thank Balazs Szentes as my advisor over the second year
of my PhD; his suggestions and comments on my work are always sharp and helpful.
Many other researchers have provided feedback on several parts of the thesis: Andrew
Ellis, Leonardo Felli, Gilat Levy, Matthew Levy, Francesco Nava, Andrea Prat, Matthew
Rabin, Ronny Razin, as well as the seminar participants at LSE. I thank them for all the
useful comments and discussions.
I want to thank Francesco Palazzo, whom I am fortunate to know at LSE as a good
friend and a smart co-author. I have learned a lot studying and working with him.
Thanks also to my fellow PhD students at LSE for making the PhD experience so much
more enjoyable.
A special thanks to Pierpaolo Benigno for his encouragement and generous support
on my PhD study.
Finally, I want to thank my family for their consistent support. I thank my parents
for their nancial support during my rst years at LSE, and more importantly, for their
care and love since I was born. I thank my wife Yanjie for coming with me to the UK
despite a promising career in China, and for believing in me throughout the years.
3
Abstract
This thesis contains two theoretical essays built upon the canonical models of social
learning, and one that applies social learning theory to durable goods markets.
The rst chapter, Non-Monotone Observational Learning, revisits the canonical
social-learning model that rationalizes herding in the long run, to investigate the pos-
sibility of non-imitative behavior in the short run generated by non-monotone learning:
ceteris paribus, when some predecessor(s) switch to actions revealing greater condence
in one state of the world, agents become less condent in that state. I characterize con-
ditions on the underlying information structures that lead to non-monotone learning.
In particular, in a general setting with continuous private signals, I provide a necessary
condition for non-monotone learning with an argument for its plausibility, as well as two
non-restrictive su¢ cient conditions that do not rely on parametrization.
The second chapter, Does Public Information Disclosure Help Social Learning?,
studies the e¤ect of releasing exogenous public information in the canonical social-learning
model that predicts incomplete learning. To improve social learning, I show that it is
weakly better to postpone the disclosure of a public signal irrespective of its precision.
However, such weak monotonicity no longer holds if the objective is to maximize the
discounted sum of peoples expected payo¤s or if the model goes beyond the canonical
binary setting. On the other hand, it is suboptimal to ever release a public signal less
precise than peoples private signals even if sophisticated releasing strategies are allowed.
The last chapter, Learning and Price Dynamics in Durable Goods Markets, is joint
work with Francesco Palazzo. We study how markets for durable goods with unobservable
and time-varying aggregate market conditions determine price dynamics with market
participants constantly learning from public observations. We set up a dynamic auction
model with two key features: rst, agents enjoy heterogeneous private use values and
later resell the asset; second, prices do not incorporate all available information dispersed
in the economy. Informational frictions slow down learning and a¤ect price movements
asymmetrically across high and low aggregate demand states. Learning and the resale
motive are the predominant force for durable goods with short resale horizons, slow time-
varying aggregate demand, and similar use values across agents.
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1 Non-Monotone Observational Learning
Whereas rational observational learning generates herds in the long run, it can lead
to behavior quite di¤erent from herding or imitation in the short run. This work revisits
the canonical binary-state model of observational learning, in which agents sequentially
choose a binary action and the history of actions is publicly observable, to investigate
the possibility of non-imitative behavior generated by non-monotone learning: ceteris
paribus, when some predecessor(s) switch to actions revealing greater condence in one
state of the world, agents become less condent in that state. In a special case with binary
signal space, we show that most agents always form such non-monotone posterior beliefs
with respect to the rst agents action. In a general setting with continuous signals, we
provide a necessary condition for non-monotone learning, and show that it fails only for
information structures that never generate public beliefs between 1
3
and 2
3
throughout
the learning process. We also provide two non-restrictive su¢ cient conditions for non-
monotone learning on information structures that are not explicitly parameterized.
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1.1 Introduction
The theoretical literature on observational learning has demonstrated that, when rational
agents with common preferences act sequentially, they tend to imitate their predecessors
and eventually exhibit herd behavior. In the canonical example of restaurant choice due
to Banerjee (1992), agents sequentially choose to eat at one of the two restaurants, A and
B, which are equally likely to be the better one a priori, and each agent obtains a binary
private signal indicating the better restaurant before making her choice. Assuming all
signals have the same precision and agents follow their private signals when indi¤erent,
when one restaurant has been chosen twice more than other, all future agents will ignore
their private signals and choose that restaurant.
Rationalizing herd behavior and imitation is considered as one key contribution of the
literature.1 Yet we are keen to know what else rational observational learning may predict.
Do rational agents always tend to imitate their predecessors throughout the learning
process? When they imitate, do they imitate each and every predecessor? Answers to
questions like these rely on a thorough understanding of rational learning models beyond
the well-established long-run predictions. In addition, more studies into the short-run
behavioral implications of rational observational learning serve to distinguish rationality
from other potential explanations of social learning, both theoretically and empirically.
Let us start by looking into the learning dynamics in the canonical example above.
We can see that agentsincentives to imitate their predecessors result from a monotone
evolution of posterior beliefs. More specically, each agent forms posterior beliefs that are
monotone with respect to her observation, in the sense that she believes one restaurant,
say A, is (weakly) more likely to be better than the other when more of her predecessors
have switched to choose A. When she observes that A has been chosen at least twice
more than B, her posterior belief after such history dominates her private information
and she then chooses A regardless of her private signal.
Is such monotonicity a general feature of observational learning? It seems plausible
at rst glance. By choosing a restaurant, each agent reveals more condence in that
1Quoting the preface of Chamley (2004) which provides a comprehensive overview of the literature,
Learning by individuals from the behavior of others and imitation pervade the social life. . . herds, fads,
bubbles, crashes, and booms are cited as proofs of the irrationality of individuals. However, most of
these colorful events will appear in the models of rational agents. . . .
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restaurant than the other, so it seems natural that, if more agents have chosen A instead
of B in the past, the history becomes stronger evidence supporting A. However, this is
not necessarily the case as the interpretation of each action in the history closely depends
on other actions, e.g., how much condence in A agent t expresses by choosing A may
change dramatically if the action of agent t   1 changes. And these interpretations are
particularly a¤ected by the underlying information structure of the model. In a variety of
settings, rational agents could indeed form non-monotone posterior beliefs with respect
to their observations, which we refer as non-monotone learning: ceteris paribus, when
some predecessor(s) switch to actions revealing greater condence in one state of the
world, agents become less condent in that state. As a consequence, agents have less
incentive to imitate their predecessors, a feature that is absent in the canonical example
and also overlooked in models extended from it.
For instance, in the restaurant-choice problem, certain signal structures could lead
agent 3 to believe B is more likely to be the better restaurant when she observes a
history (A;B) than when she observes a history (B;B). Fixing agent 2s action, the
more agent 1s action reveals condence in A, the less condent agent 3 becomes in
A. We refer this particular case of non-monotone learning, where agent 3s beliefs shift
against the action of agent 1, as agent 3 forming posterior beliefs that are anti-imitative
of agent 1.2 It is worth mentioning that xing agent 2s action makes the comparison
more interesting, because agent 3s posterior belief is always consistent with agent 2s
action, i.e., the Overturning Principle in Smith and Sørensen (2000).3
To further elaborate such an example, we adopt a setting close to that of Callander
and Hörner (2009) in which agents are heterogeneously informed. Some agents are experts
who have private signals about whether A or B is better with precision q > 0:5. Others
are just amateurs who know nothing at all. In Callander and Hörner (2009), agents can
only observe the total number of agents having chosen each option, and they show that
uninformed agents (amateurs) should follow theminority of their predecessors rather than
the majority, when informed agents (experts) are rare.4 Such behavior is clearly di¤erent
2The formal denition of anti-imitative beliefs is provided in Section 1:2.
3See the proof of Theorem 3 in Smith and Sørensen (2000) or Lemma 1:3:2 in this paper.
4Callander and Hörner (2009) assume that informed agents have perfect private information, i.e.,
q = 1, hence they only focus on the rational behavior of uninformed agents.
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from what might be expected based on the canonical example, and more fundamentally,
the posterior beliefs of uninformed agents are clearly not monotone with respect to the
summary statistic they observe. Here we show that similar but less extreme information
structures can indeed lead to non-monotone learning even if we maintain the assumption
that each agent observes the order of all predecessorsmoves as in the canonical example.
In particular, when the fraction of experts in the population, r, is su¢ ciently large or the
precision q is su¢ ciently high, agent 3 will form beliefs that are anti-imitative of agent
1 as described in the last paragraph. To get the intuition, think about the comparison
between history (A;B) and history (B;B). (A;B) reveals one weak piece of evidence
against B from the rst action A, as it could just be a random choice by an amateur.
Meanwhile (A;B) reveals one strong piece of evidence supporting B from the second
action B, as it must be an informative choice by an expert since an amateur, lacking
private information, would have followed the rst action A. On the other hand, (B;B)
reveals two weak pieces of evidence supporting B as each action B could come from an
amateur. When r (q) is very high which implies the weak (strong) evidence is fairly
insignicant (signicant), (A;B) may turn out to be an overall stronger piece of evidence
supportingB than (B;B). Furthermore, we also provide conditions on q and r for massive
instances of anti-imitative beliefs: each agent from agent 3 on will form posterior beliefs
that are anti-imitative of agent 1 after any possible equilibrium history, even though they
all share the same preference as agent 1 and there are no strategic e¤ects at all.5
Knowing that di¤erent information structures can dramatically a¤ect a rational agents
inference from her observations and possibly lead to non-monotone learning, we then turn
to a general model with continuous private signals due to Smith and Sørensen (2000). A
nice feature of this model is that it guarantees behavioral di¤erences whenever learning
is non-monotone. In particular, if one agent forms beliefs that are anti-imitative of a
predecessor and private signals are continuous, she would indeed choose B with higher
probability had that predecessor switched from B to A, i.e., she anti-imitates that prede-
cessor.6 On the other hand, we want to emphasize that such anti-imitative behavior does
not contradict but rather sit side by side with the long-run herd behavior that has been
5Agent 2s posterior belief cannot be anti-imitative according to the overturning principle.
6We show in Section 1:2 that, with binary private signals, anti-imitative beliefs do not necessarily
induce such behavioral di¤erence.
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demonstrated in this model.7 Hopefully our investigation could draw further attention to
comprehensive and thorough studies of many existing learning models in which rational
behavior during the learning process may be quite di¤erent from the long-run predictions
already established.
We rst characterize the learning dynamics along any equilibrium path by introducing
two transition functions that describe the movement of public beliefs from one period to
the next, one for each possible realization of the most recent action. In other words,
these transition functions govern the learning process in term of beliefs along all possible
histories. A necessary condition for non-monotone learning is that the transition functions
are non-monotone in public beliefs. To see why non-monotone transition functions are
necessary, let us consider a change of action fromA toB by a number of agents. According
to the overturning principle, the public belief right after the last agent who changes his
action now supports B instead of A. If the transition functions are always monotone,
then all the public beliefs generated thereafter will always shift toward B and hence
learning cannot be non-monotone. It is probably too abstract to think about the shape
of transition functions, but we make an interesting observation: if transition functions
are monotone, then public beliefs cannot enter the interval (1
3
; 2
3
) after any history. This
observation casts doubt on the plausibility of monotone transition functions, as it is very
hard to believe that we live in a world which never allows us to have moderate public
beliefs about the unknown.8 Therefore we must at least worry about non-monotone
learning and anti-imitation most of the times.
We then provide a su¢ cient condition for non-monotone learning and anti-imitation
based on our ndings in the binary-signal setting. There we have shown that agent 3s
posterior belief is anti-imitative of agent 1 when the fraction of amateurs is su¢ ciently
large. It suggests that learning is probably non-monotone as well in the continuous model,
which then leads to anti-imitation, when private signals are most likely uninformative.
Hence we consider distributions of private beliefs that have high density around 1
2
, i.e.,
most agents are almost uninformed, and provide a su¢ cient condition for each agent
7See for example Theorem 3(b) about action convergence in Smith and Sørensen (2000).
8For example, in medical research physicians are allowed to o¤er patients randomization to di¤erent
treatments only if clinical equipoise exists, i.e., there is genuine uncertainty in the expert medical com-
munity over whether a treatment will be benecial. In other words, the community of physicians should
regard the treatments as (roughly) equally preferable. See Freedman (1987).
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t + 2 to anti-imitate agent t.9 Loosely speaking, it requires the distributions to have
thicktails, in the sense that the conditional expectation of private beliefs larger than
1
2
is su¢ ciently far away from 1
2
. The intuition behind this condition is analogous to
what we have in the binary-signal setting: high density around 1
2
corresponds to a large
r and thick tails correspond to a large q.10 If learning is conducted in a society where
most people barely have any private knowledge but those who do have some knowledge
are su¢ ciently knowledgeable on average, it is bound to exhibit anti-imitative behavior.
Such information structures are reasonable in many contexts of social learning such as
technology adoption or development of medical treatments, where most of us really know
little but those technicians or physicians are usually well recognized for their expertise.11
Another interesting result is a boundary condition on the distributions of private
beliefs that guarantees non-monotone learning. We show that the transition functions
of public beliefs are decreasing around the boundaries when the distribution of private
beliefs are sharply diminishing around the boundaries. As learning completes eventually,
public beliefs are bound to be close to the boundaries after su¢ ciently long histories and
then decreasing transition functions lead to non-monotone learning.12 This condition can
be satised by a variety of common distributions; being a boundary condition, it can
also be approximatelysatised by essentially every distribution.13 On the other hand,
in the absence of explicit parametrization of the information structure, we nd it hard
and most likely intractable to get a necessary and su¢ cient condition for non-monotone
learning in general.
9For technical convenience we focus on the distributions of private beliefs rather than private signals
as in Smith and Sørensen (2000).
10In the binary-signal model, the conditional expectation of private beliefs larger than 12 is exactly q.
11Learning and information aggregation are indeed more desirable when individuals have limited pri-
vate knowledge. For example, Conley and Udry (2010) investigate the di¤usion of a new agricultural
technology in Ghana, and nd evidence that farmers adjust their inputs to align with those who were
surprisingly successful in previous periods, which indicates the presence of social learning. However the
input choices for another crop of known technology indicate an absence of social learning e¤ects.
12We assume unbounded private beliefs in the model to ensure complete learning. See Theorem 1(b)
in Smith and Sørensen (2000).
13See further discussion in Section 1:3 and Appendix.
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1.1.1 Related Literature
The theoretical literature on observational learning has conventionally focused on asymp-
totic properties and few papers have deliberately studied the dynamics of learning and its
behavioral implications short of the limit. This work is closest to Callander and Hörner
(2009) as both highlight the impact of information structures on the learning process,
which leads to behavior quite di¤erent from the canonical predictions. We di¤er from
Callander and Hörner (2009) by maintaining the full observation assumption and con-
sidering more general information structures, but as mentioned before, the information
structure in their paper shares the intuition of non-monotone learning in our work. On
the other hand, Eyster and Rabin (2014) study the impact of observation structures in-
stead and question the rationality of imitative behavior.14 They provide a necessary and
su¢ cient condition on observation structures for rational anti-imitation, and the logic
lies in the fact that rational agents need to take into account the redundancy of previous
actions under those structures.15
Other work in the literature mainly studies the e¢ ciency of information aggrega-
tion and the long-run herd behavior but has substantially extended the rst models by
Banerjee (1992), Bikhchandani et al. (1992), and Smith and Sørensen (2000) in di¤erent
respects. The assumption of full observation has been relaxed by, for example, Çelen
and Kariv (2004) where each agent is only allowed to observe her immediate predecessor.
They show that beliefs and actions end up cycling and learning is never complete.16 Per-
haps the most comprehensive generalization in this respect is by Acemoglu et al. (2011),
which allows the observation structure to be a network topology.17 They show that as-
ymptotic learning is achieved with unbounded private beliefs when the network topology
has expanding observations: agents should not be conned to receive information from
a bounded subset of other agents. Few recent papers such as Guarino et al. (2011) and
14An observation structure is a directed network and they consider general networks other than the
canonical single-le setting. See also Jackson (2008) for comprehensive discussion on social networks.
15Note that their condition on observation structures is necessary and su¢ cient when the action space
is continuous, hence it is still possible to have anti-imitation in the canonical model with binary actions
even though their condition is violated.
16Incomplete learning and non-converging actions are not due to their observational assumption
though. In fact, according to Acemoglu et al. (2011), learning is complete (with unbounded private
beliefs) in the canonical model even if one can only observe her immediate predecessor.
17The network topology in Acemoglu et al. (2011) is similar to Eyster and Rabin (2014) but also allows
stochastic sampling like in Banerjee and Fudenberg (2004) or Smith and Sørensen (2008).
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Herrera and Hörner (2013) alter the observational assumptions in another way by assum-
ing that only certain realization of actions is observable. Yet none of these papers talks
about (non-)monotone properties of learning process or anti-imitation.
There is also a growing number of papers that relax the assumption of myopic pref-
erences and introduce payo¤ interdependence among agents. It is less surprising to see
anti-imitation or even contrarian behavior when there are negative externalities such as
congestion costs in Eyster et al. (2014). But observational learning models with payo¤ex-
ternalities are generally hard to solve due to the existence of forward-looking incentives.18
Dasgupta (2000) studies social learning in coordination problems and demonstrates that
agents exhibit herd behavior as complete imitation under certain information structures.
In the context of sequential elections, Ali and Kartik (2012) manage to characterize con-
ditions on the payo¤ interdependence that will guarantee sincere behavior by agents and
eventually a herd.
Most empirical and experimental work on observational learning follows the main fo-
cus in the theoretical literature and justies imitative behavior and herding. For example,
Moretti (2011) uses box-o¢ ce data and nds that the sales of movies with positive and
negative opening-weekend surprises in demand diverge over time: a movie that experi-
ences larger sales in Week 1 will experience further increasing sales in subsequent weeks.
He considers such imitative behavior by consumers as a result of social learning and fur-
ther quanties the e¤ect of social learning on movie sales. Cai et al. (2009) conduct a eld
experiment to distinguish imitative observational learning from salience in which they tell
diners either the recently popular dishes or the feature dishes. They nd that diners
react more strongly to popularity than to salience, which convincingly suggests that din-
ers imitate. Our work, on the other hand, will potentially raise the question whether the
imitative behavior detected by these papers comes from rational observational learning.19
Herd behavior has also been extensively studied in the sequential trading model of
nancial market introduced by Glosten and Milgrom (1985), and Park and Sabourian
(2011) further investigate the possibility of contrarianism: traders buy (sell) assets after
18Besides Eyster et al. (2014), a lot of work assumes only backward incentives such as queuing models
by Debo et al. (2012) and Cripps and Thomas (2014).
19In Cai et al. (2009), the popularity of dishes is sorted by the actual number of plates sold in the
previous week. So roughly speaking, they are really only looking at how agent 2 reacts to agent 1, and
we know that there is no anti-imitation due to the overturning principle.
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observing histories that reveal bad (good) information about the asset value. Their work
builds on the seminal paper by Avery and Zemsky (1998) which shows that there are no
informational cascades in such model with informationally e¢ cient prices and it is unlikely
to have herding behavior unless signals are non-monotonic. Park and Sabourian (2011)
instead argue that the monotonicity of signals dened by Avery and Zemsky (1998)
is disputable and describe conditions on the underlying information structure that are
necessary and su¢ cient for herding or contrarianism. Dasgupta and Prat (2008) bring
the sequential trading model together with the reputational herding model established
by Scharfstein and Stein (1990) and demonstrate herd behavior when agents have career
concerns. However, due to the existence of a competitive market maker who consistently
adjusts the bid (ask) prices based on the public histories, all these papers implicitly
impose heterogeneous payo¤ functions of traders.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We begin with the simple model
with binary private signals in Section 1:2. Section 1:3 develops some general results for
the model with continuous private signals. Section 1:4 concludes.
1.2 A Simple Setting with Binary Private Signals
1.2.1 Setup
We consider a simple variant of the setting by Callander and Hörner (2009). There is an
underlying state of the world,  2 fA;Bg, whose realization is unknown to the population,
a countable set of agents. Agents hold a common prior of , Pr( = A) = Pr( = B) =
0:5. There is an innite time horizon, t 2 f1; 2; 3; : : :g, and at each period t an agent is
chosen to make a once-in-a-life-time binary decision, at 2 fA;Bg.20 Unlike Callander and
Hörner (2009), the history of past actions, ht  (a1; a2; : : : ; at), is publicly observable for
all the future agents. Agents have common payo¤ functions u(at; ) = 1fat=g.
There are two informational types of agent. An agent can be an expert, who receives
a private signal t 2 fA;Bg, which matches the true state with probability q 2 (12 ; 1),
before making her decision. Or she can be an amateur, who does not receive any private
signals. Each agents type is her private information but the probability of being an
20We simply refer the agent acting at period t as agent t throughout the paper.
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amateur, r 2 (0; 1), is the same across all agents and commonly known.
Let lt+1  l(ht)  ln Pr(=Bjht)Pr(=Ajht) = ln
Pr(htj=B)
Pr(htj=A) be the posterior log-likelihood ratio of
agent t+1 after observing history ht but before acquiring her private signal. We also call
lt+1 the public belief as history ht is publicly observed by all future agents, with l1 = 0
as the prior.21 Let us rst solve the Bayesian decision problem of each agent.22
Lemma 1.2.1 Agent 1 follows her private signal if she is an expert, and (by assumption)
randomly chooses between A and B if she is an amateur. Agent t  2 follows her
immediate predecessor if she is an amateur or jltj > ln q1 q , and follows her private signal
otherwise.
Proof. See Appendix.
An amateur, absent of private signals, will just follow her immediate predecessor, as
she knows no more than her immediate predecessor, who has the same preference and
acted rationally. On the other hand, an expert will stick to her private signal as long as its
precision outweighs the public belief, i.e., ln q
1 q  jltj, but follows what the public belief
suggests otherwise. With individual decision problems solved, we can then characterize
the dynamics of fltg1t=1 along every equilibrium history.23
Lemma 1.2.2 Let M  ln r 12+(1 r)q
r 1
2
+(1 r)(1 q) , L  ln
r+(1 r)q
r+(1 r)(1 q) , and H  ln q1 q . Along
every equilibrium path h1  (a1; a2; : : : ; at; : : :), the public beliefs evolve in the following
21The term public belief has been broadly used in the literature, which is the posterior likelihood of a
certain state after a history. We use log-likelihood ratio here for technical convenience.
22It is not hard to see that in this binary decision problem, each agents decision rule is unique up to
a tie-breaking rule. Here we simply assume an expert follows her private signal when indi¤erent and the
rst agent randomly chooses between A and B if she is an amateur. Tie-breaking assumptions are no
longer important for the continuous-signal model in Section 1:3.
23As all agents are myopic here, we do not emphasize a particular notion of equilibrium, and an
equilibrium history is simple a history that is consistent with the individual decision rule described in
Lemma 1:2:1. Readers can nevertheless assume what we have in mind is the standard Bayesian Nash
Equilibrium throughout the paper.
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way:
l1 = 0; l2 =
8<: M if a1 = B M if a1 = A ;
8t  2, lt+1 =
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
lt +H if at = B and at 1 = A
lt  H if at = A and at 1 = B
lt + L if at = at 1 = B and lt  H
lt   L if at = at 1 = A and lt   H
lt otherwise
.
Proof. See Appendix.
Except for the rst action a1, each action later in the history reveals a strong piece of
evidence, a weak piece of evidence, or no evidence at all.24 If at+1 is di¤erent from at, it
must come from an expert hence it is a strong piece of evidence, which shifts the public
belief by H. If at+1 is the same as at and jltj  H, it is only meaningful if it comes from
an expert, which happens with probability 1  r, hence it is a weak piece of evidence and
only shifts the public belief by L. If at+1 is the same as at but jltj > H, it reveals no
more information as both types will follow the immediate predecessor at anyway, hence
the public belief remains unchanged thereafter, i.e., Informational Cascade.25
1.2.2 Non-Monotone Learning
To introduce the (non-)monotone property we are interested in this paper, let us set a
simple linear order - on fA;Bg such that A - B (and of course B - B). Then we can
induce a partial order on each Cartesian product fA;Bgt, 8t 2 N+:
8ht;h0t 2 fA;Bgt, ht - h0t if and only if a - a0 for any   t.
24The rst action a1 comes from either an informative choice by an expert or a random choice by an
amateur, and by Bayes rule it turns out to be a mediocrepiece of evidence compared to later actions.
25See Bikhchandani et al. (1992).
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Denition 1.1 Learning is monotone if
8t 2 N+, 8 two equilibrium histories ht and h0t s.t. ht - h0t, lt+1  l(ht)  l(h0t)  l0t+1.
Learning is non-monotone otherwise, or equivalently,
9 two equilibrium histories ht and h0t s.t. ht - h0t, ht 6= h0t and lt+1 > l0t+1.
The non-monotonicity given by Denition 1:1 is straightforward. Suppose some ac-
tions A(s) in an equilibrium history ht are switched to B(s) while the other actions
remain unchanged, and let us compare the posterior belief of agent t+ 1 after observing
this new history h0t with the original posterior belief after observing ht.
26 If the new
posterior belief is smaller, i.e., agent t + 1 is less condent in state B although more of
her predecessors showed condence in state A, we say learning is non-monotone.
Clearly the canonical restaurant-choice example discussed in the introduction does not
exhibit such non-monotonicity, however we will show that learning can be non-monotone
under the setting introduced in Section 1:2. In fact, we focus on some particular cases
where only one agents action is altered in the history.
Denition 1.2 Consider two equilibrium histories (ht;h0t) that di¤er only in one action:
9  t s.t. a = A, a0 = B; 8 0  t and  0 6=  , a 0 = a0 0 :
We say the posterior belief of agent t+ 1 is anti-imitative of agent  under the pair
(ht;h
0
t) if lt+1 > l
0
t+1.
We say the posterior belief of agent t + 1 is always anti-imitative of agent  if
lt+1 > l
0
t+1 for every such pair (ht;h
0
t).
Anti-imitative posterior belief refers to a special case of non-monotone learning: xing
the actions of all the predecessors of agent t+ 1 other than agent  , agent t+ 1 becomes
less condent in state B though agent s action reveals more condence in state B. In
other words, it is as if the posterior belief of agent t+ 1 anti-imitatesagent s action.
26Denition 1 requires the new history h0t to be an equilibrium history as well, otherwise posterior
beliefs are not well-dened after o¤-equilibrium histories and the comparison becomes meaningless.
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Now let us go back to the model and investigate the possibility of non-monotone
learning, particularly anti-imitative posterior belief. We consider the case with  = 1,
i.e., only agent 1s action is altered between two histories27. Obviously by Lemma 1:2:2
agent 2s posterior belief cannot be anti-imitative of agent 1, hence we start the analysis
from agent 3 onwards. For convenience we present most results here using H, M , and L
dened in Lemma 1:2:2.
Proposition 1.2.1 1. The posterior belief of agent 3 is always anti-imitative of agent 1
if and only if
H > 2M + L, or equivalently,
r3
(1  r)2(1 + r) > 4q(1  q).
2. The posterior belief of each agent t  3 is always anti-imitative of agent 1 if and
only if
H > 2M + L and H > 2M + (k   2)L where k  minfk 2 N+jM + kL > Hg.
Proof. See Appendix.
The logic behind the rst result in Proposition 1:2:1 is as follows. According to
Denition 1:2, agent 3 needs to compare two histories, h2 = (A;B) and h
0
2 = (B;B).
28
History (A;B) reveals one mediocre evidence against state B from the rst action A but
one strong evidence in favor of state B from the second action B, and by Lemma 1:2:2
the posterior belief after (A;B) can be precisely calculated as l3 =  M + H. On the
other hand, history (B;B) reveals one mediocre and one weak evidence in favor of B from
the rst and second action B respectively, and by Lemma 1:2:2 the posterior belief after
(B;B) is l03 = M + L. To make the posterior belief of agent 3 anti-imitative, we need
l3 > l
0
3 or simply H > 2M+L. It is not hard to see that this inequality can be satised by
some pair (r; q) such that r or q is su¢ ciently high, i.e., either the weak/mediocre piece
27With two informational types (expert and amateur), anti-imitative beliefs can only appear with
respect to the rst agents action. Other formats of anti-imitative beliefs and non-monotone learning
can appear in either binary-signal settings with more informational types or the continuous-signal set-
ting in Section 1:3. Nevertheless, the simple setting here su¢ ces to capture the intuition about how
heterogeneous informational types can lead to anti-imitative beliefs.
28The other comparison between (A;A) and (B;A) is symmetric.
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of evidence is fairly insignicant or the strong piece of evidence is su¢ ciently dominant.29
The second result in Proposition 1:2:1 builds on the rst one. Suppose the posterior
belief of agent 3 is already anti-imitative, i.e., l((A;B)) > l((B;B)). By Lemma 1:2:2,
extending the two histories by one same action will shift the posterior belief toward the
same direction and by the same amount, H or L, therefore the inequality still holds.
This logic works for further extensions as well, until the posterior belief after one history,
say lt, grows beyond the precision of private signals, i.e., jltj > ln q1 q . Since then lt no
longer changes and l0t will catch up until jl0tj > ln q1 q as well. The extra condition in the
second result precisely takes account of this subtle di¤erence and assures that l0t will not
exceed lt in the end.
We have shown that, contrast to the canonical model and what people might have
learned from the existing literature, learning is indeed non-monotone in this simple setting
with heterogeneous informed agents. More surprisingly, all the successors of agent 1
except agent 2 will form beliefs that are anti-imitative of agent 1, even though they all
have the same preference as agent 1. Nevertheless, we do want to point out that the
second result of Proposition 1:2:1 does not contradict with the existing results on the
long-run behavior of agents, e.g., an informational cascade occurs eventually or a herd
arises eventually.30 In fact, anti-imitative belief does not necessarily lead to anti-imitative
behavior, especially when the private signals are discrete.
Denition 1.3 Consider two equilibrium histories (ht;h0t) that di¤er only in one action:
9  t s.t. a = A, a0 = B; 8 0  t and  0 6=  , a 0 = a0 0 :
We say agent t+ 1 anti-imitates agent  under the pair (ht;h0t) if
Pr(at+1 = Bjht) > Pr(at+1 = Bjh0t).
29In Appendix, we indeed show that agent 3s posterior belief is anti-imitative of agent 1 when r p
5 1
2 , for any q 2 ( 12 ; 1).
30See Proposition 1 in Bikhchandani et al. (1992) or Theorem 3(a) in Smith and Sørensen (2000).
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We say agent t+ 1 always anti-imitates agent  if
Pr(at+1 = Bjht) > Pr(at+1 = Bjh0t) for every such pair (ht;h0t).
This denition of anti-imitative behavior is in the same spirit of anti-imitation dened
in Eyster and Rabin (2014), except that we use probabilistic criterion here on account of
the binary action space.31 To see the di¤erence between anti-imitative belief and anti-
imitative behavior, let us reconsider agent 3 after history (A;B) or (B;B). Suppose
the posterior belief of agent 3 is already anti-imitative, i.e., l((A;B)) > l((B;B)) or
H > 2M+L. If agent 3 is an amateur, she will choose B after both histories according to
Lemma 1:2:1. If agent 3 is an expert, she will follow his private signal after both histories
according to Lemma 1:2:1, since l((A;B)) = H  M < H and l((B;B)) = M + L < H.
Therefore, although agent 3s posterior belief is anti-imitative, there is no probabilistic
di¤erence in her behavior and she does not anti-imitate agent 1.
Corollary 1.2.1 Under any pair of equilibrium histories (ht;h0t) that di¤er only in the
rst action, at most (k   3) agents anti-imitate agent 1, where k has been dened in
Proposition 1:2:1.
Proof. See Appendix.
Since amateurs always follow their immediate predecessors, only the behavior of ex-
perts could be di¤erent after two histories that di¤er in the rst action. And according
to Lemma 1:2:2, that happens only when the posterior belief after one history, say lt, has
exceeded the precision of private signals while the posterior belief after the other, say l0t,
has not. In that situation an expert will follow her immediate predecessor after lt but
follow her private signal after l0t. However, as we discussed earlier, l
0
t will catch up along
the history and eventually exceeds the threshold as well. Hence such behavioral di¤erence
can only exist for a nite number of future agents, and the upper bound of that number
is precisely (k   3). It is worth noting that Corollary 1:2:1 is indeed consistent with the
long-run behavior predicted by the existing literature.
31See Denition 5 in Eyster and Rabin (2014) for a comparison. They assume continuous action space
as in Lee (1993) and hence dene anti-imitation as one agents action being decreasing in some action(s)
she observes.
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In the next section we will turn to a model with continuous private signals, in order
to better understand the impact of underlying information structures on the learning
process. Besides, as we will see, the continuous model gets rid of the subtle di¤erence
between anti-imitative belief and anti-imitative behavior and thus allows a clear focus.
1.3 A Model with Continuous Private Signals
1.3.1 Setup
We consider the observational learning model with continuous private signals due to
Smith and Sørensen (2000). There is an underlying state of the world,  2 fA;Bg,
whose realization is unknown. Agents hold a common prior of , Pr( = A) = Pr( =
B) = 0:5. Agents move sequentially over an innite time horizon, t 2 f1; 2; 3; : : :g,
and each agent t makes a once-in-a-life-time binary decision, at 2 fA;Bg, with payo¤
u(at; ) = 1fat=g.The history of past actions, ht  (a1; a2; : : : ; at), is publicly observable
for all the future agents. Besides, each agent at period t will receive a private signal
t 2 [c; c] before making her choice. Conditional on , ftg1t=1 are independently and
identically distributed across t.
Following Smith and Sørensen (2000), we work directly with qt  Pr( = Bjt) 2
[0; 1], the private belief of agent t after observing her private signal t. The reason
for such normalization is that what matters for each agent is the information generated
by her private signal rather than the realization of private signal itself. Let G(x) be
the cumulative distribution function of qt conditional on . GA(x) and GB(x) capture
the information structure, and if both are di¤erentiable with density function gA(x) and
gB(x) respectively, the unconditional density function of qt, g(x)  gA(x)+gB(x)2 is already
su¢ cient. In particular, Bayesian updating implies gA(x)
gB(x)
= x
1 x and thus gA(x) = 2xg(x)
and gB(x) = 2(1  x)g(x).32 We will use g(x) in most results when convenient.
We impose the following assumptions on g(x):
1. Full support : g(x) is strictly positive on [0; 1].
32The private belief structure is commonly used in the literature. Curious readers can look at Appendix
A in Smith and Sørensen (2000) and Section 3:A in Smith et al. (2012) for the justication of it.
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2. Di¤erentiability: g(x) is continuously twice di¤erentiable on (0; 1); both limx!0+ g00(x)
and limx!1  g00(x) exist.
3. Symmetry: g(x) = g(1  x), 8x 2 [0; 1].
The assumption of full support implies that private beliefs are unbounded, which
guarantees that no history of actions is o¤ equilibrium, as each agent has strictly positive
probability to follow her private signal no matter what the history was. Hence we are
free to compare any pair of histories when investigating whether learning is monotone or
not. The assumption of twice di¤erentiability allows us to conduct certain mathematical
analysis later.33 The assumption of symmetry, like the binary-signal model in Section
1:2, reduce the number of comparisons (by half) we need to make as we can focus on the
pattern of histories rather than every particular realization.
1.3.2 A Necessary Condition for Non-Monotone Learning
We start by solving the Bayesian decision problem of each agent as well as characterizing
the dynamics of public beliefs, fltg1t=1. Recall again that public belief after a history ht
is exactly the posterior belief of agent t + 1 before her getting her private belief. For
convenience, here we use posterior probability that state B is the true state rather than
posterior log-likelihood ratio used in Section 1:2, i.e., lt+1  Pr( = Bjht) with l1 = 12 .
Lemma 1.3.1 Agent t who forms public belief lt from history and private belief qt from
her signal will choose at = B if and only if qt  1  lt.
Therefore the stochastic process fltg1t=1 in equilibrium is characterized by the following
transition functions:
lt+1 =
8<: m(lt) 
ltGB(1 lt)
ltGB(1 lt)+(1 lt)GA(1 lt) if at = A
n(lt)  lt[1 GB(1 lt)]lt[1 GB(1 lt)]+(1 lt)[1 GA(1 lt)] if at = B
.
Moreover, m(lt) = 1  n(1  lt).
Proof. See Appendix.
33In fact k(x) being continuous di¤erentiable is su¢ cient for most of the analysis. We only need
twice di¤erentiability in the proof of Proposition 1:3:3 that needs higher order Taylor expansion, but the
proposition itself does not explicitly involve k00(x).
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Similar to the binary-signal model in Section 1:2, what rational agents are really doing
here is comparing the public belief generated from the observed history with the private
belief generated from their private signals. For instance, agent t will choose B under one
of the following three circumstances:
both the public belief and her private belief supports B, i.e., qt >
1
2
and lt >
1
2
;
her private belief supports B and is stronger than the public belief which supports A,
i.e., qt >
1
2
, lt <
1
2
but qt  1  lt;
the public belief supports B and is stronger than her private belief which supports A,
i.e., qt <
1
2
, lt >
1
2
but lt  1  qt.
Clearly these can be summarized as just qt  1   lt. The dynamics of public beliefs
then simply comes from the individual decision rule and Bayes rule. In particular, the
transition function, m() or n(), captures how the public beliefs evolve from one period
to the next, when the most recent action is A or B.
We may well start to answer the main question: Can learning be non-monotone? Let
us stick to Denition 1:1, 1:2, and 1:3, respectively, for (non-)monotone learning, anti-
imitative belief and anti-imitative behavior.34 Recall that there are no o¤-equilibrium
histories with unbounded private beliefs, which can be easily seen from Lemma 1:3:1,
hence these denitions apply to every possible pair of histories. We rst provide a neces-
sary condition for non-monotone learning.
Lemma 1.3.2 (Overturning Principle) lt+1 > 12 if at = B and lt+1 <
1
2
if at = A.
Proof. See Appendix or the proof of Theorem 3 in Smith and Sørensen (2000).
Proposition 1.3.1 Learning is non-monotone only if the transition function m() or
n() is non-monotone. Or equivalently,
9x 2 (0; 1) s.t. gB(1  x)
GB(1  x)  
gA(1  x)
GA(1  x) >
1
(1  x)x or
gB(x)
GB(x)
  gA(x)
GA(x)
>
1
x(1  x) .
34As posterior log-likelihood ratio is a strictly monotone transformation of posterior probability, there
is no need to provide redundant denitions here.
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Proof. See Appendix.
Quite intuitively, non-monotone learning requires non-monotone transitions of poste-
rior beliefs. To see it clearly, let us think about two di¤erent histories ht and h
0
t such
that ht - h0t. If ht and h0t di¤er on the last action, i.e., at = A and a0t = B, then clearly
lt+1 < l
0
t+1 by the overturning principle. If ht and h
0
t only di¤er up to some earlier period
 < t, then l+1 < l0+1, again by the overturning principle. Since after period  actions
are identical between the two histories, agents should update their beliefs using the same
transition function from period  + 1 on along the two histories. If both m() and n()
are monotone, then the inequality l  l0will be preserved from period  + 1 on as well,
and hence non-monotone learning, i.e., lt+1 > l0t+1, is not possible.
We automatically have the following corollary that gives the necessary condition in
terms of g(x).
Corollary 1.3.1 Learning is non-monotone only if g(x), the unconditional density func-
tion of private beliefs, is such that
9x 2 (0; 1) s.t. g(x)[ (1  x)R 1
x
(1  s)g(s)ds  
xR 1
x
sg(s)ds
] >
1
x(1  x)
or g(x)[
xR x
0
sg(s)ds
  1  xR x
0
(1  s)g(s)ds ] >
1
x(1  x) .
Proof. Simply apply gA(x) = 2xg(x) and gB(x) = 2(1  x)g(x).
Numerical calculations can easily provide some simple symmetric distributions on
[0; 1] that satisfy this necessary condition.
1. Linear Density: g(x) = (4  8) x  1
2
+ 2, 8 2 (5
7
; 1);
2. Quadratic Density: g(x) = (x  1
2
)2 + (1  
12
), 8 2 ( 6; 2);
3. Beta Distribution: g(x) = x
 1(1 x) 1
B(;)
with B(; )  R 1
0
s 1(1   s) 1ds, for
su¢ ciently large .35
35We get  > 28 roughly, using Kumaraswamys distribution as in Jones (2009) to approximate Beta
distribution.
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With the complicated expression in Corollary 1:3:1, it is probably hard to see whether
the necessary condition is likely to be satised or not. Nevertheless we make the following
observation that the necessary condition is violated only by information structures that
always generate su¢ ciently strong public beliefs along the learning process.
Claim 1.3.1 If transition functions n() and m() are monotone, then in equilibrium
lt =2 (1
3
;
2
3
), 8t  2.
Proof. See Appendix.
When transition functions are monotone, we have a strongeroverturning principle
(compared to Lemma 1:3:2): lt+1  23 if at = B and lt+1  13 if at = A.36 However it
seems extraordinary that public beliefs cannot enter the interval (1
3
; 2
3
) after any history.
Imagine that agents later in the sequence observe a very long history of alternating As
and Bs, (A;B;A;B; : : : ; A;B). If the public belief is very close to 1
2
, which is what we
would naturally expect after observing a large but equal number of As and Bs, then
the transition functions must be non-monotone. In fact it is very hard to believe that
the underlying information structure never allow agents to have moderate public beliefs
throughout the learning process. Hence the plausibility of monotone transition functions
is questionable in general, which suggests that we must at least worry about learning
being non-monotone most of the times.
Yet the necessary condition does not guarantee non-monotone learning or anti-imitation.
The distribution of private beliefs determines not only transition functions m() and n(),
but at the mean time also the possible posterior beliefs that can be generated by dif-
ferent histories. Hence, the selection of distributions is in general hard because we have
to make sure not only that transition functions are non-monotone, but also that such
non-monotonicity is relevant in equilibrium. If transition functions are decreasing only
over a subset of [0; 1] that is, roughly speaking, never enteredor passed throughby
posterior beliefs generated by any history, learning is still monotone and agents do not
36These bounds depend on the technical assumptions on the information structure. For example, if
k(0) = 0 and k0(0) > 0, the interval becomes ( 25 ;
3
5 ). However what matters here is that the public beliefs
are always su¢ ciently bounded away from 12 when the transition functions are monotone.
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anti-imitate. With this concern in mind, we make further observations and provide a few
interesting su¢ cient conditions.
1.3.3 Two Su¢ cient Conditions for Non-Monotone Learning
We begin with a su¢ cient condition that is somewhat analogous to what we have seen
in Section 1:2. Recall that in the simple model with binary private signals, the posterior
belief of agent 3 is always anti-imitative of agent 1 when the fraction of uninformed
agents is su¢ ciently large, but agent 3 never anti-imitates agent 1. Back to the current
model with continuous private signals/beliefs, we rst claim the equivalence between anti-
imitative beliefs and anti-imitative behavior and then provide a similar condition on the
continuous distribution of private beliefs that guarantees anti-imitation by agent 3.
Claim 1.3.2 Let (ht;h0t) be a pair of histories such that
9  t s.t. a = A, a0 = B; 8 0  t and  0 6=  , a 0 = a0 0.
Agent t + 1 anti-imitates agent   t under (ht;h0t) if and only if the posterior belief of
agent t+ 1 is anti-imitative of agent  under (ht;h
0
t
_). In other words, Denition 1:2 and
1:3 are equivalent.
Proof. See Appendix.
Anti-imitative beliefs implies that, according to Lemma 1:3:1, the threshold in the
decision rule of agent t+ 1 is lower after ht than after h
0
t, i.e., lt+1 > l
0
t+1 =) 1  lt+1 <
1   l0t+1. When private belief qt+1 is unbounded and continuously distributed, lower
threshold always leads to higher probability of choosing B, hence agent t+1 also exhibits
anti-imitative behavior.
Proposition 1.3.2 Consider a sequence of continuously twice di¤erentiable and sym-
metric density functions on [0; 1], fgs()g1s=1. Let Zs be a random variable on [0; 1] that
is distributed according to gs and let "s  E[ZsjZs  12 ]  12 .37
37"s is essentially the rst absolute central moment of the distribution gs.
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Let X 1
2
be an almost surely constant random variable with sole realization 1
2
. Suppose
the sequence fgs()g1s=1 and fZsg1s=1 are such at
1. Zs
d! X 1
2
as s!1;
2. 9S 2 N+ s.t. 8s > S, gs(1
2
)  "s  1
2
.
Then 8t  1, 9St 2 N+ s.t. 8s > St, agent t+2 always anti-imitates agent t in equilibrium
when the unconditional density function of private beliefs is gs().
Proof. See Appendix.
The conditions in Proposition 1:2:1 for the binary-signal model, particularly that r is
su¢ ciently large, suggest that we might also have anti-imitation in the continuous model
when the distribution of private beliefs is heavily centered around 1
2
, i.e., most agents
are more or less uninformed. Indeed, Proposition 1:3:2 says that agent t + 2 always
anti-imitates agent t under some heavily centered distributions that satises an extra
condition. Roughly speaking, this extra condition requires thicktails of the probability
density functions that converge to  1
2
(), in the sense that the conditional expectation of
private beliefs on the left(right) of 1
2
should move to 1
2
somehow slowerthan the increase
of the density at 1
2
. In fact, to make an analogy, the binary-signal model does satisfy this
condition in a particular way: the conditional expectation of private beliefs on the left or
right of 1
2
is 1  q or q, which is always bounded away from 1
2
.
Mathematically, what this condition really does is to make sure that the transition
functions are decreasing around 1
2
. Think about the comparison between history h2 =
(A;B) and h02 = (B;B). After the rst action, l2 <
1
2
< l02 but both l2 and l
0
2 are close
to 1
2
when most agents are almost uninformed. If transition function n() is decreasing
around 1
2
while l2 and l02 are so close to
1
2
that both are within the decreasing region of
n(), we have l3 = n(l2) > n(l02) = l03. Hence agent 3 anti-imitates agent 1.
Let us give an example in order to better illustrate this condition. Transition func-
tion n() is not decreasing around 1
2
with the following sequence of (truncated) Normal
distributions,
gsN(x) 
s
2
R s=2
0
e t2dt
 exp[ s2(x  1
2
)2];
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Figure 1: Examples of Proposition 1:3:2.
but it is with the following sequence of (truncated) Cauchy distributions
gsC(x) 
s
2 arctan( s
2
)
 1
1 + s2(x  1
2
)2
,
which are known as heavy-tailed distributions.38
We like to point out that Proposition 1:3:2 does not require an explicit functional
form of gs(), but it does not tell how close to  1
2
() the thick-tailed distribution needs to
be either. If we are looking at a particular class of distributions with explicit parameters,
we can always have a precise condition by using Lemma 1:3:1:
agent 3 always anti-imitates agent 1 if and only if n(m(
1
2
)) > n(n(
1
2
)).
Take the sequence of (modied) Cauchy distributions fgsC()g1s=1 for example. Numerical
calculation yields that agent 3 always anti-imitate agent 1 when s > 22:1.
Careful readers probably have noticed in the gure above that, although the transition
function n() associated with (truncated) Normal distributions is not decreasing around
1
2
, it is decreasing around 0. The fact that some distributions of private beliefs generate
transitions functions that are decreasing around 0 or 1 is what drives the next su¢ cient
38See Johnson and Kotz (1982). Note that the distributions here are not exactly Normal and Cauchy
distributions. Since the support is [0; 1] rather than R, we have to use truncated distribution.
29
condition. We rst recall the famous result by Smith and Sørensen (2000) that learning
is complete eventually with unbounded private beliefs.
Lemma 1.3.3 (Complete Learning) With unbounded private beliefs, lt  ! 1f=Bg
almost surely as t  ! +1.
Proof. See Theorem 1(b) in Smith and Sørensen (2000).
Complete learning implies that public beliefs will be su¢ ciently close to either 0 or 1
after a su¢ ciently long history. If the transition functions are decreasing around 0 and 1,
we can be certain that eventually public beliefs will reach those decreasing regions, which
then erases the gap between non-monotone learning and non-monotone transitions
discussed earlier. Therefore we have the following su¢ cient condition for non-monotone
learning.
Proposition 1.3.3 Learning is non-monotone if
lim
x!0+g
0(x)
g(0)
> 3.
Proof. See Appendix.
When the density function g() is diminishing su¢ ciently fast at the boundaries of
[0; 1], the transition functions are decreasing around 0 or 1. In particular, m() is decreas-
ing around 1 and n() is decreasing around 0, i.e., n() is decreasing over (0; ") for some
small " and symmetrically m() is decreasing over (1  "; 1).
Let us compare the posterior beliefs after any two histories, ht and h
0
t, such that
ht - h0t and ht 6= h0t. Generically the beliefs are di¤erent as well, lt+1 6= l0t+1.39 Complete
learning implies that both lt+1 and l0t+1 are within either (0; ") or (1   "; 1) when t is
su¢ ciently large. Suppose the true state is A and hence the former is the case. If
lt+1 > l
0
t+1, learning is non-monotone by denition. If lt+1 < l
0
t+1, we can simply extend
ht and h
0
t by an action B, i.e., ht+1 = (ht; B) and h
0
t+1 = (h
0
t; B). But now lt+2 =
n(lt+1) > n(l
0
t+1) = l
0
t+2, so learning is non-monotone. Notice that when ht and h
0
t only
di¤er in one action, we e¤ectively get anti-imitation by either agent t+ 1 or agent t+ 2.
The su¢ cient condition in Proposition 1:3:3 can be satised by a variety of (truncated)
common distributions on [0; 1]:
39For a generic density function k(), we can always construct two di¤erent histories that generate
di¤erent posterior beliefs.
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1. Linear Density: g(x) = (4  8) x  1
2
+ 2, 8 2 (5
7
; 1);
2. Quadratic Density: g(x) = (x  1
2
)2 + (1  
12
), 8 2 ( 6; 2);
3. (Truncated) Double Exponential Distribution: g(x) = exp( 
jx  12 j

)
2(1 exp(  1
2
))
, 8 2 (0; 1
3
);
4. (Truncated) Normal Distribution: g(x) = 
2
R =2
0 e
 t2dt
 exp[ 2(x  1
2
)2], 8 > 2p3;
5. (Truncated) Cauchy Distribution: g(x) = 
2 arctan(
2
)
 1
1+2(x  1
2
)2
, 8 > 2p3.40
In fact, as a boundary condition, it can be "approximately" satised by essentially
every symmetric and twice di¤erentiable density function with full support [0; 1], and we
provide a claim about this in Appendix.
We have characterized two circumstances where non-monotone transition functions
become su¢ cient for non-monotone learning: transitions function are decreasing around
1
2
or around 0(1). Unfortunately it is not very clear to us what will happen if the transition
functions are decreasing somewhere else in general. We do want to emphasize though,
that Lemma 1:3:1 gives an explicit algorithm to calculate public beliefs and hence a precise
condition for non-monotone learning is always achievable, at least numerically, once we
restrict attention on certain classes of distributions with parameters. Nevertheless, it is
hard to establish a precise condition that, like Proposition 1:3:2 and 1:3:3, applies to a
general distribution without any parametrization.
1.4 Conclusion
In this paper we reconsider the standard observational learning models where agents
act myopically and share common preferences. We study how underlying information
structures a¤ect the evolution of posterior beliefs as well as the behavior of rational agents.
We show that learning is not always monotone in these models: rational agents often
form posterior beliefs that are non-monotone with respect to the actions they observe.
As a result, alongside the long-run herd behavior that has been well established by the
40For (truncated) Cauchy distribution with  > 14:3, we could indeed have very large decreasing
regions, i.e., n() is decreasing over (0; 12 ) and m() is decreasing over ( 12 ; 1), which have also been
captured by the earlier graph. In that case learning is non-monotone even under a pair of very short
histories.
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existing literature, it is rational for agents to anti-imitate some of the predecessors during
the learning process.
We rst look into a simple model with binary private signals and two informational
types of agents, i.e., agents are either uninformed or informed by a private signal with
certain precision. We nd that learning is non-monotone when the probability of being
uninformed is su¢ ciently large or the private signals are su¢ ciently precise. In particular,
under such information structures, the third agent as well as each agent after her always
form posterior beliefs that are non-monotone with respect to the action of the rst agent.
Consequently, some of them anti-imitate the rst agent: ceteris paribus, they are more
likely to choose one action when the rst agent has switched to the opposite, even in the
absence of any strategic concern or preference heterogeneity.
Next we investigate the observational-learning model with continuous private signals
that has been extensively studied in the literature since Smith and Sørensen (2000). We
provide an intuitive necessary condition for non-monotone learning and anti-imitation:
transitions of public beliefs need to be non-monotone. And we argue that the necessary
condition is likely to be satised as any information structure violating it never generates
moderate public beliefs during learning. Then we make further observations on when
this necessary condition could become su¢ cient and obtain two su¢ cient conditions. We
nd that when the transition functions are non-monotone over certain subsets of the unit
interval, such as around the middle or near the two boundaries, learning is non-monotone
and hence some agents anti-imitate their predecessor(s). Though we are still in search for
a general necessary and su¢ cient condition, we do have a complete characterization of
the learning process so it is possible to get a precise condition on parameter values if we
restrict attention to information structures captured by certain classes of distributions.
However non-parametric results other than what we have presented are in general quite
hard to get and further work out of this paper is most welcome.
We treat this paper as an interesting contribution to the literature of observational
learning, where most work has been done on the e¢ ciency of information aggregation and
the long-run behavior of agents. Our work shows that, in the short run, rational agents
may indeed act quite di¤erently from what we might expect based on the asymptotic
outcomes we already know. It is clearly important as well to understand the behavioral
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implications of rational learning short of the limit, a lot of which we are still not clear
about or at least cannot simply induce from the existing results.
1.5 Appendix
1.5.1 Omitted Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1:2:1. Agent 1s decision rule is trivial. Now without loss of generality
let us assume at = A and consider agent t + 1. If agent t + 1 is an amateur, she will
nd A optimal as well since she holds no more information than agent t, who has the
same preference and rationally chose A. In other words, agent t + 1s posterior, before
receiving her private signal if she is an expert, should be (weakly) in favor of A:
lt+1 = ln
Pr(ht = (a1; a2; : : : ; at = A)j = B)
Pr(ht = (a1; a2; : : : ; at = A)j = A)  0.
If agent t+ 1 is an expert with private signal t+1, she will update her posterior by:
l0t+1 = ln
Pr(ht = (a1; a2; : : : ; at = A); t+1j = B)
Pr(ht = (a1; a2; : : : ; at = A); t+1j = A)
=
8<: lt+1 + ln
1 q
q
if t+1 = A
lt+1 + ln
q
1 q if t+1 = B
=
8>>><>>>:
lt+1   ln q1 q < 0 if t+1 = A
ln q
1 q   jlt+1j  0 if t+1 = B and jlt+1j  ln q1 q
ln q
1 q   jlt+1j < 0 if t+1 = B and jlt+1j > ln q1 q
.
Assuming agent t+ 1 will follow her private signal when indi¤erent, i.e., l0t+1 = 0, we can
see that her decision rule is exactly what Lemma 1:2:1 describes.
Proof of Lemma 1:2:2. By Lemma 1:2:1, the rst action a1 is either a random choice
if agent 1 is an amateur or the same as 1 if agent 1 is an expert. Hence by Bayes rule,
l2 = ln
Pr(a1j = B)
Pr(a1j = A) =
8<: ln
r 1
2
+(1 r)q
r 1
2
+(1 r)(1 q) = M if a1 = B
ln
r 1
2
+(1 r)(1 q)
r 1
2
+(1 r)q =  M if a1 = A
.
For all t  2, if at+1 6= at then by Lemma 1:2:1 agent t + 1 must be an expert with
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t+1 = at+1.41 Hence by Bayes rule,
lt+1 = ln
Pr(ht = (a1; a2; : : : ; at; at+1 6= at)j = B)
Pr(ht = (a1; a2; : : : ; at; at+1 6= at)j = A)
= lt + ln
Pr(at+1j = B)
Pr(at+1j = A) =
8<: lt + ln
q
1 q = lt +H if at+1 = B
lt + ln
1 q
q
= lt  H if at+1 = A
.
If at+1 = at and jltj  ln q1 q = H, by Lemma 1:2:1 we know that agent t+ 1 is either an
amateur or an expert with t+1 = at+1. Hence by Bayes rule,
lt+1 = ln
Pr(ht = (a1; a2; : : : ; at; at+1 = at)j = B)
Pr(ht = (a1; a2; : : : ; at; at+1 = at)j = A)
= lt + ln
Pr(at+1 = atj = B; jltj  H)
Pr(at+1 = atj = A; jltj  H) =
8<: lt + ln
r+(1 r)q
r+(1 r)(1 q) = lt + L if at+1 = B
lt + ln
r+(1 r)(1 q)
r+(1 r)q = lt   L if at+1 = A
.
If at+1 = at but jltj > ln q1 q = H, by Lemma 1:2:1 agent t + 1 always follows agent t
regardless of her type and private signal, hence the public belief remains unchanged.
Proof of Proposition 1:2:1. For the rst result, let us consider agent 3s posterior
belief after observing h2 = (A;B) or h
0
2 = (B;B). According to Lemma 1:2:2,
l3 =  M +H, l03 = M + L
=) l3 > l03 i¤H > 2M + L.
Due to the symmetric structure of this model, the other comparison between eh2 = (A;A)
and eh02 = (B;A) will yield the same inequality.42
el3 =  M   L, el03 = M  H
=) el3 > el03 i¤H > 2M + L.
Hence the posterior belief of agent 3 is always anti-imitative of agent 1 if and only if
H > 2M + L. Plug in the denitions of H, M , and L in Lemma 1:2:2, we can rewrite
41Note that at+1 6= at implies jltj  ln q1 q = H according to Lemma 2:1. Hence a history such that
at+1 6= at and jltj > H for some t is o¤ equilibrium and not considered by Lemma 2:2.
42We will use the symmetric structure of private signals and equilibrium dynamics to simplify future
proofs as well.
34
this inequality in terms of r and q:
H > 2M + L
() ln q
1  q > 2 ln
r  1
2
+ (1  r)  q
r  1
2
+ (1  r)  (1  q) + ln
r + (1  r)  q
r + (1  r)  (1  q)
() q
1  q > [
r  1
2
+ (1  r)  q
r  1
2
+ (1  r)  (1  q) ]
2  r + (1  r)  q
r + (1  r)  (1  q)
() r
3
(1  r)2(1 + r) > 4q(1  q).
Note that 4q(1  q) < 1 for q 2 (1
2
; 1), so clearly we can nd some pair (r; q) that satises
this inequality. For example,
8r 2 [
p
5  1
2
; 1), 8q 2 (1
2
; 1),
r3
(1  r)2(1 + r)  1 > 4q(1  q).
For the second result, let us start with agent 4. By symmetry, we only focus on two
comparisons: h3 = (A;B;B) with h
0
3 = (B;B;B), eh3 = (A;B;A) with eh03 = (B;B;A).
l4 = l3 + L, l04 = l
0
3 + L
=) l4 > l04 i¤ l3 > l03 i¤H > 2M + L;el4 = l3  H, el04 = l03  H
=) el4 > el04 i¤ l3 > l03 i¤H > 2M + L.
HenceH > 2M+L guarantees that agent 4s posterior belief is also anti-imitative. In fact
we can see that, as long as each new action added to the histories updates the posterior
beliefs in exactly the same way, we do not need extra conditions for anti-imitative beliefs of
future agents. However, according to Lemma 1:2:2, the update di¤ers when one posterior
belief has absolute value bigger than H but not the other, and we need extra conditions
to take that into account.
Consider the earliest such instance: h4 = (A;B;B;B) with h
0
4 = (B;B;B;B). The
posterior belief after h4 is
l5 =  M +H + 2L = H + (2L M) > H,
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since it is easy to verify that L < M < 2L. Therefore the only equilibrium history
extended from h4 is ht = (A;B;B;B; : : : ; B) for t  4 and the only valid equilibrium
history extended from h04 to compare is h
0
t = (B;B;B;B; : : : ; B) for t  4. By Lemma
1:2:2 it is not di¢ cult to calculate the corresponding lt+1 and l0t+1:
lt+1 = l5 = H + (2L M), 8t  4;
l0t+1 =
8<: M + (t  1)L if 4  t  k + 1M + kL if t > k + 1 ,
where k  minfk 2 N+jM + kL > Hg.43 Clearly, lt+1 > l0t+1 for every t  4 i¤
H + (2L M) > M + kL() H > 2M + (k   2)L.
Note that H > 2M + L and M > L implies that k  3, so this extra condition is not
redundant in general.
Moreover, the same extra condition will be yielded if we compare two histories where
the actions herd on A rather than B eventually. For example, let us consider eh4 =
(A;A;A;A) and eh04 = (B;A;A;A). By symmetry el05 =  l5 <  H, hence the only
equilibrium history extend from eh04 is eh0t = (B;A;A;A; : : : ; A) for t  4 and the only
valid equilibrium history extended from eh4 to compare is eht = (A;A;A;A; : : : ; A) for
t  4. By symmetry again,
el0t+1 =  lt+1 =  H   (2L M), 8t  4;
elt+1 =  l0t+1 =
8<:  M   (t  1)L if 4  t  k + 1 M   kL if t > k + 1 ,
where k is the same as before. Clearly, elt+1 > el0t+1 for every t  4 i¤
 M   kL >  H   (2L M)() H > 2M + (k   2)L.
For a general pair of equilibrium histories that di¤er only in the rst action, agents
43It takes (k   3) periods for l0t+1 to grow until beyond H.
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might ip between A and B multiple times before a herd starts eventually. However,
we do not need other extra conditions to take care of them because, as argued earlier,
all those actions before the eventual herd update the posterior beliefs in exactly the
same way. Therefore, the only condition required here, in addition to H > 2M + L, is
H > 2M + (k   2)L.
Lastly, to see the existence of (r; q) that satises H > 2M + (k  2)L, we can rewrite
this extra condition as
2L M > M + kL H () 2  M
L
> k   (H  M
L
).
As M
L
2 (1; 2) and H M
L
2 [k   1; k),
2  M
L
> k   (H  M
L
)()  (M
L
) <  (
H  M
L
),
where  (x)  x maxfn 2 Njn  xg, 8x > 0. It is easy to verify that M
L
! 2 as r ! 1,
thus  (M
L
) > 0:5 for su¢ ciently large r and
if  (
M
L
) > 0:5,  (
M
L
) <  (
H  M
L
)()  (H
L
) 2 (2 (M
L
)  1;  (M
L
))  [0; 1).
Obviously H
L
! +1 as r ! 1, hence for su¢ ciently large r,  (H
L
) will go through the
whole interval [0; 1) innitely many times. Therefore the extra condition can be satised
for some (but not every) su¢ ciently large r.
Proof of Corollary 1:2:1. Clearly agent 2 will not anti-imitate agent 1 so let us
consider two equilibrium histories with length at least 2 that di¤er only in the rst
action. Without loss of generality let us also assume the last action of both histories is
B, i.e., ht = (A; : : : ; B);h
0
t = (B; : : : ; B), t  2.
If agent t+1 is an amateur, she always follows her immediate predecessor and chooses
B, so an amateur cannot anti-imitate agent 1. Now suppose agent t + 1 is an expert.
According to Lemma 1:2:1, the only way to induce anti-imitative behavior of her is that
lt+1 > H and l0t+1  H,
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in which case agent t + 1 always chooses B after ht but still follows her private signal
t+1 after l0t+1. Then unconditional on her informational type, the probability of agent
t+ 1 choosing B is,
Pr(at+1 = Bjht) = r  1 + (1  r)  1;
Pr(at+1 = Bjh0t) = r  1 + (1  r)  Pr(t+1 = Bjh0t) =
1 + r
2
< 1.
However, lt+1 never changes after period t + 1 while l0t+1 will gradually increase until it
exceeds H according to Lemma 1:2:2, and there is no more behavioral di¤erence for either
type from then on. The number of periods it takes for l0t+1 to increase until beyond H
has been calculated in the proof of Proposition 1:2:1, which is at most k   3.
Proof of Lemma 1:3:1. Agent t choose at = B if and only if Pr( = Bjlt; t)  0:5.44
By Bayes rule,
Pr( = Bjlt; t) = ltfB(t)
ltfB(t) + (1  lt)fA(t) and qt  Pr( = Bjt) =
1
2
fB(t)
1
2
fB(t) +
1
2
fA(t)
,
therefore
Pr( = Bjlt; t)  0:5 () fB(t)
fA(t)
 1  lt
lt
() qt
1  qt  1  lt () qt  1  lt.
By symmetry, we only show the transition function is lt+1 = m(lt) when at = A.
lt+1  Pr( = Bjht) = Pr( = Bjht 1; at = A)
=
Pr(at = Aj = B;ht 1) Pr( = Bjht 1)
Pr(at = Aj = B;ht 1) Pr( = Bjht 1) + Pr(at = Aj = A;ht 1) Pr( = Ajht 1)
=
ltGB(1  lt)
ltGB(1  lt) + (1  lt)GA(1  lt) according to agent ts decision rule.
The fact that m(lt) = 1  n(1  lt) comes directly from symmetry.
Proof of Lemma 1:3:2. By symmetry, we only show lt+1 < 12 if at = A. By Lemma
1:3:1,
lt+1 =
ltGB(1  lt)
ltGB(1  lt) + (1  lt)GA(1  lt) if at = A.
44Tie-breaking rule is not important given continuous distributions of private beliefs.
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Note that
8x 2 (0; 1), gB(x)
gA(x)
=
x
1  x =)
GB(x)
GA(x)
<
x
1  x
=) lt+1 = ltGB(1  lt)
ltGB(1  lt) + (1  lt)GA(1  lt) <
lt 1(1  lt 1)
2lt 1(1  lt 1) =
1
2
.
Proof of Proposition 1:3:1. Suppose that both m() and n() are monotone, i.e.,
80 < x < x0 < 1, m(x0)  m(x) and n(x0)  n(x).
Let F be the set of all nite-order compositions of m() and n(), i.e.,
F = [i2N+Fi, with F1 = fm;ng and Fi+1 = fm  f; n  f j8f 2 Fig for i  1.
Obviously all functions in F are monotone: 8f 2 F , 80 < x < x0 < 1, f(x0)  f(x).
Now take any two histories ht and h
0
t such that ht - h0t and ht 6= h0t. Let  
maxf  tja = A and a0 = Bg. If  = t, lt+1 < 12 < l0t+1 according to Lemma 1:3:2,
which violates Denition 1:1. If  < t,
l+1 <
1
2
< l0+1 by Lemma 1:3:2;
a = a
0
 , 8 <   t =) by Lemma 1:3:1, 9f 2 F s.t. lt+1 = f(l+1), l0t+1 = f(l0+1).
But f is monotone, so lt+1 = f(l+1)  f(l0+1) = l0t+1, which again violates Denition
1:1. Therefore learning cannot be non-monotone.
To get the explicit conditions on g() for non-monotone transition functions, let us
rst look at m().45 m() is continuously di¤erentiable by Lemma 1:3:1 and
sgn(
dm(x)
dx
) = sgn (
d( m(x)
1 m(x))
dx
) = sgn(
d( xGB(1 x)
(1 x)GA(1 x))
dx
) by Lemma 1:3:1.
45Herrera and Hörner (2012) derived a necessary and su¢ cient condition for monotone transition
functions, which is the increasing hazard ratio property of private signals. It can be veried that the
explicit conditions in Proposition 1:3:1 indeed violate that property, and hence transition functions are
non-monotone.
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The explicit derivative is
d( xGB(1 x)
(1 x)GA(1 x))
dx
=
xGB(1  x)
(1  x)GA(1  x)f
1
x(1  x)   [
gB(1  x)
GB(1  x)  
gA(1  x)
GA(1  x) ]g.
Hence
sgn(
dm(x)
dx
) = sgn(
1
x(1  x)   [
gB(1  x)
GB(1  x)  
gA(1  x)
GA(1  x) ])
=) m() is non-monotone i¤ 9x 2 (0; 1) s.t. gB(1  x)
GB(1  x)  
gA(1  x)
GA(1  x) >
1
(1  x)x .
Note that m(x) = 1 n(1 x) (from Lemma 1:3:1) implies that dm(x)
dx
< 0 if and only
if dn(1 x)
d(1 x) < 0. So clearly,
n() is non-monotone i¤ 9x 2 (0; 1) s.t. gB(x)
GB(x)
  gA(x)
GA(x)
>
1
x(1  x) .
Proof of Claim 1:3:1. We rst show that limx!0+ n(x) = 23 and limx!0+ n(x) =
2
3
.
Note that
lim
x!0+
n(x)
1  n(x) = limx!0+
x[1 GB(1  x)]
(1  x)[1 GA(1  x)]
= lim
x!0+
xGA(x)
(1  x)GB(x) by symmetry.
Both GA and GB are continuously twice di¤erentiable as g(x) is continuously di¤eren-
tiable, so Taylor expansion yields
GA(x) = 0 + gA(0)x+O(x
2) = 2g(0)x+O(x2),
GB(x) = 0 + gB(0)x+
lim
x!0+
g0B(x)
2
x2 +O(x3) = g(0)x2 +O(x3).
Hence
lim
x!0+
n(x)
1  n(x) = limx!0+
2g(0)x2 +O(x3)
g(0)x2 +O(x3)
= 2.
Therefore limx!0+ n(x) = 23 and by symmetry limx!1 m(x) =
1
3
.
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By denition of n() and m() in Lemma 1:3:1, limx!0+ m(x) = 0 and limx!1  n(x) =
1. If n() and m() are monotone,
8x 2 [0; 1], n(x) 2 [2
3
; 1] and m(x) 2 [0; 1
3
].
By Lemma 1:3:1, lt (t  2) must be within the image of n() or m(), hence lt =2 (13 ; 23).
Proof of Claim 1:3:2. By Lemma 1:3:1,
Pr(at+1 = Bjht)  Pr(at+1 = Bjh0t) > 0
() Pr(qt+1  1  lt+1)  Pr(qt+1  1  l0t+1) > 0
() Pr(qt+1 2 [1  lt+1; 1  l0t+1)) > 0
() lt+1 > l0t+1,
where the rst equivalence comes from the fact that qt+1 is independent of ht and h
0
t.
Clearly Denition 1:2 and 1:3 are now equivalent.
Proof of Proposition 1:3:2. We start by showing if gs() is the unconditional pdf
of private beliefs and gs(1
2
)  "s  12 , then the transition functions satisfy that m0(12) =
n0(1
2
) < 0.
m0(1
2
) = n0(1
2
) comes directly from symmetry. Note that
GB(
1
2
) =
Z 1
2
0
2xgs(x)dx =
R 1
2
0
xgs(x)dxR 1
2
0
gs(x)dx
= E[ZsjZs  1
2
] =
1
2
  "s;
GA(
1
2
) = 1 GB(1
2
) =
1
2
+ "s.
On the other hand, gs(1
2
)  "s  12 =) gs(12)  12"s > 12"s   2"s =
1 4"2s
2"s
. Hence
gB(
1
2
)
GB(
1
2
)
  gA(
1
2
)
GA(
1
2
)
=
gs(1
2
)
1
2
  "s  
gs(1
2
)
1
2
+ "s
= gs(
1
2
)  8"s
1  4"2s
>
1  4"2s
2"s
 8"s
1  4"2s
= 4.
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In the proof of Proposition 1:3:1 we have veried that
n0(
1
2
) < 0 i¤
gB(
1
2
)
GB(
1
2
)
  gA(
1
2
)
GA(
1
2
)
>
1
1
2
(1  1
2
)
= 4,
so clearly m0(1
2
) = n0(1
2
) < 0.
Take t = 1 and we want to show that agent 3 always anti-imitate agent 1. By
symmetry we only compare history h3 = (A;B) with h
0
3 = (B;B). By Lemma 1:3:1,
l3 = n(m(
1
2
)) = n(GB(
1
2
)) and l03 = n(n(
1
2
)) = n(GA(
1
2
)).
Hence
l3   l03 = n(
1
2
  "s)  n(1
2
+ "s).
Clearly "s ! 0 as s!1 since Zs d! X 1
2
as s!1. Both n() and m() are continuously
di¤erentiable, so by rst-order Taylor expansion,
9eS1 s.t. 8s > eS1, l3   l03 =  2"s  n0(12) +O("2s).
We know from above that n0(1
2
) < 0 when s > S, therefore 8s > S1  maxfS; eS1g,
l3   l03 > 0 and agent 3 always anti-imitates agent 1.
Now take t = 2. First we compare h3 = (A;A;A) with h
0
3 = (A;B;A). Again by
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rst-order Taylor expansion,
l4 = m(m(m(
1
2
))) = m(m(
1
2
  "s))
= m(m(
1
2
) m0(1
2
)"s +O("
2
s))
= m(
1
2
  "s  m0(1
2
)"s +O("
2
s))
= m(
1
2
)  [m0(1
2
) + (m0(
1
2
))2]"s +O("
2
s);
l04 = m(n(m(
1
2
))) = m(n(
1
2
  "s))
= m(n(
1
2
)  n0(1
2
)"s +O("
2
s))
= m(
1
2
+ "s   n0(1
2
)"s +O("
2
s))
= m(
1
2
) + [m0(
1
2
) m0(1
2
)n0(
1
2
)]"s +O("
2
s).
Note that m0(1
2
) = n0(1
2
) and thus
9eS2 s.t. 8s > eS2, l3   l03 =  2"s m0(12) +O("2s).
Then we compare h3 = (A;A;B) with h
0
3 = (A;B;B). Similarly we have
l4 = n(m(m(
1
2
))) = n(m(
1
2
  "s))
= n(m(
1
2
) m0(1
2
)"s +O("
2
s))
= n(
1
2
  "s  m0(1
2
)"s +O("
2
s))
= n(
1
2
)  [n0(1
2
) + n0(
1
2
)m0(
1
2
)]"s +O("
2
s);
l04 = n(n(m(
1
2
))) = n(n(
1
2
  "s))
= n(n(
1
2
)  n0(1
2
)"s +O("
2
s))
= n(
1
2
+ "s   n0(1
2
)"s +O("
2
s))
= n(
1
2
) + [n0(
1
2
)  (n0(1
2
))2]"s +O("
2
s).
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Note that m0(1
2
) = n0(1
2
) and thus
9bS2 s.t. 8s > bS2, l3   l03 =  2"s  n0(12) +O("2s).
Therefore, 8s > S2  maxfS; eS2; bS2g, l4 l04 > 0. By symmetry we dont need to compare
other pairs so agent 4 always anti-imitates agent 2.
For t  3, we want to compare ht+1 and h0t+1 that di¤er only in the t-th action (at = A
and a0t = B). Using rst-order Taylor expansion recursively like we did, it is easy to get
that when s is su¢ ciently large,
lt+2   l0t+2 =
8<:  2"s m0(12) +O("2s) if at+1 is A 2"s  n0(12) +O("2s) if at+1 is B .
Hence 9St  S s.t. 8s > St, lt+2   l0t+2 > 0 and agent t+ 2 always anti-imitates agent t.
Proof of Proposition 1:3:3. We rst show that,
if lim
x!0+
g0(x)
g(0)
> 3, lim
x!0+
dm(x)
dx
< 0.
Recall that sgn[dm(x)
dx
] = sgn [
d(
m(x)
1 m(x) )
dx
] and we have already calculated the
d(
m(x)
1 m(x) )
dx
in the proof of Proposition 1:3:1:
lim
x!1 
d( m(x)
1 m(x))
dx
= lim
x!1 
xGB(1  x)
(1  x)GA(1  x) [
1
x(1  x)  
gB(1  x)
GB(1  x) +
gA(1  x)
GA(1  x) ]
= lim
z!0+
GA(z)GB(z) + z(1  z)[gA(z)GB(z) GA(z)gB(z)]
z2G2A(z)
(z  1  x)
= lim
z!0+
GA(z)GB(z) + 2z(1  z)g(z)[(1  z)GB(z)  zGA(z)]
z2G2A(z)
.
To simplify the expressions later, let R  g(0) > 0 and W  lim
x!0+
g0(x). Both GA and
GB are continuously three times di¤erentiable as g() is continuously twice di¤erentiable,
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so Taylor expansion yields that
g(z) = g(0) + lim
z!0+
g0(z)z +O(z2) = R +Wz +O(z2);
GA(z) = 0 + gA(0)z +
lim
z!0+
g0A(z)
2
z2 +O(z3) = 2Rz + (W  R)z2 +O(z3);
GB(z) = 0 + gB(0)z +
lim
z!0+
g0B(z)
2
z2 +
lim
z!0+
g00B(z)
6
z3 +O(z4) = Rz2 +
2
3
Wz3 +O(z4).
Plug these back to the expression above,
lim
x!1 
d( m(x)
1 m(x))
dx
= lim
z!0+
GA(z)GB(z) + 2z(1  z)g(z)[(1  z)GB(z)  zGA(z)]
z2G2A(z)
= lim
z!0+
(R2   1
3
RW )z4 +O(z5)
4R2z4 +O(z5)
=
3R W
12R
< 0 since
W
R
> 3 and R > 0.
Therefore limx!1 
dm(x)
dx
< 0 and by symmetry limx!0+
dn(x)
dx
< 0. By continuous di¤er-
entiability of m() and n(),
9" > 0 s.t. 8x 2 (0; "), dn(x)
dx
< 0; 8x 2 (1  "; 1), dm(x)
dx
< 0.
Without loss of generality, let us assume  = A. Consider two histories, ht and h
0
t,
such that
1. ht - h0t and ht 6= h0t;
2. lt+1 6= l0t+1 and flt+1; l0t+1g  (0; ").
Such histories exist when t is su¢ cient large, because of Lemma 1:3:4 and the fact that,
for a generic density function g(), we can always construct two di¤erent histories that
generate di¤erent posterior beliefs.46 If lt+1 > l0t+1, learning is monotone by denition. If
46Since we are allowed to increase the length of the two histories arbitrarily, a density function k()
that always leads to lt+1 = l0t+1 is non-generic.
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lt+1 < l
0
t+1, we can simply extend ht and h
0
t by an action B, i.e.,
ht+1 = (ht; B) and h
0
t+1 = (h
0
t; B).
According to Lemma 1:3:1, lt+2 = n(lt+1) > n(l0t+1) = l
0
t+2. So learning is again non-
monotone.
1.5.2 Additional Claim
Here we present a claim related to Proposition 1:3:3, and show that any information
structure satisfying the primary assumptions imposed in Subsection 1:3:1 can be well
approximated by another information structure that leads to non-monotone learning. It
is not hard to understand this claim, given that Proposition 1:3:3 only imposes a boundary
condition on the information structure.
Claim 1.5.1 Take any density function g() on [0; 1] that satises the assumptions of full
support, di¤erentiability, and symmetry. There exists a density function on [0; 1], g(; ),
such that
g(; )! g() as  ! 0, and lim
x!0+
dg(x; )
dx
> 3  g(0; ) for any  > 0.
Learning is then non-monotone with g(0; ) being the unconditional density function of
private beliefs.
Proof. Construct g(x; )  g(x)  + b(x; ), where 0 <  < min
x2[0;1]
g(x) and b(x; ) 
[x(1 x)]
B(1+ ;1+)
is the pdf of Beta distribution.
Note that
lim
x!0+
!0+
db(x; )
dx
! +1
=) 9 > 0 s.t. lim
x!0+
db(x; )
dx
>
[3  g(0)  lim
x!0+
g0(x)]

  3.
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Clearly g(; )! g() as  ! 0, and
lim
x!0+
dg(x; )
dx
= lim
x!0+
g0(x) +  lim
x!0+
db(x; )
dx
> lim
x!0+
g0(x) + 3  g(0)  lim
x!0+
g0(x)  3
= 3  g(0)  3 = 3  g(0; ).
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2 Does Public Information Disclosure Help Social
Learning?
This work studies the e¤ect of releasing exogenous public information in the canonical
social-learning model that predicts informational cascades and incomplete learning. In
particular, we consider the simple setting with binary states, binary actions, and binary
private signals. For the purpose of increasing the average expected payo¤ of the pop-
ulation, we show that it is weakly better to postpone the disclosure of a public signal
irrespective of its precision. However, such weak monotonicity no longer holds if the
objective is to maximize the discounted sum of peoples expected payo¤s or if the model
goes beyond the binary setting. On the other hand, it is suboptimal to ever release a
public signal that is less precise than peoples private signals even if sophisticated releas-
ing strategies are allowed as noisy public information crowds out private information and
harms information aggregation.
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2.1 Introduction
As important as the rationalization of herd behavior, one contribution of the theoret-
ical literature on rational social learning is the prediction of incomplete learning, i.e.,
ine¢ cient information aggregation among the population, when people have boundedly
accurate private information. In the canonical binary model due to Bikhchandani et
al. (1992), agents make binary choices between A and B sequentially over an innite
time horizon, and before taking her action, each agent receives a private binary signal
indicating which option is better with uniform precision and observes all the past ac-
tions. Eventually rational agents herd without fully learning the truth and informational
cascade arises.47
Like every other economic model that predicts ine¢ cient outcomes, we naturally
ask ourselves of potential ways to improve e¢ ciency in such environments. In fact, as
Bikhchandani et al. (1992) pointed out, informational cascades are fragile: since infor-
mation stops to aggregate, the cascades and hence the herds are vulnerable to new pieces
of information. Therefore it is worthwhile to investigate whether and how disclosure of
exogenous public information can improve social learning.
We introduce a social planner to the canonical binary model, who receives an extra
signal about the truth with certain precision and decides whether and when to release it
to the public to maximize the average expected payo¤ of the population.48 In particular,
the social planner is looking for the optimal timing (if any) of releasing that public signal,
given its precision, that essentially maximizes the expected payo¤ of limiting agents.
We rst provide an anti-transparency result: the social planner should never release
a noisy public signal that is less precise than peoples private signals. An informational
cascade arises when one action, say A, has been chosen at least twice more than B, and
agents start to herd on A.49 Releasing a noisy public signal then cannot break down the
informational cascade as agents will continue to herd on A even when the public signal
47Strictly speaking, incomplete learning does not necessarily imply informational cascades when private
signals are continuous rather than discrete. See Herrera and Hörner (2012) for a discussion about a
necessary and su¢ cient condition on the distribution of private signals for informational cascades.
48Due to the presence of herd behavior, the average expected payo¤ of the population is equivalent to
the expected payo¤ of limiting agents. This is a common objective of interest in the literature of social
learning, and we use it as a measure of social welfare for the social planner. In Section 2:3 we will discuss
an alternative objective function of the social planner.
49We assume each agent follows her private signal when indi¤erent.
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suggests B: combining the history and the public signal, future agents still nd action A
su¢ ciently attractive. Hence a noisy public signal has no e¤ect on the limiting expected
payo¤ if it is released after an informational cascade has arisen. On the other hand, when
an informational cascade has not yet formed, releasing a noisy public signal may induce a
wrong cascade in the future more likely than peoples own private signals due to the lower
precision, hence lowers the limiting expected payo¤. Therefore overall to release a noisy
public signal is a bad idea for the social planner. Moreover, this result is robust when
sophisticated releasing strategies are allowed, i.e., a noisy public signal should never be
released even if the social planner can make the timing of disclosure contingent on the
history of past actions.50
The other result, perhaps more interesting, is a monotonicity result: the expected
payo¤ of limiting agents is weakly increasing in the period at which the public signal
is released, regardless of its precision. In other words, the social planner should always
postpone the disclosure of any public information.51 The intuition behind this result is
that the benet of releasing a public signal is greater when an informational cascade
has arisen than when it has not. Before a cascade starts the information aggregation of
private signals is still going on, so a public signal released then may crowd out the next
private signal(s) in terms of updating peoples belief. Hence the netinformational con-
tribution of the public signal is lower than when it is released after a cascade has started.
Meanwhile, the probability of entering an informational cascade is weakly increasing over
time, thus implies that the benet of releasing a public signal is also weakly increasing
over time.
Nevertheless the monotonicity result seems not compelling especially for extremely
precise public signals: suppose the social planner holds a public signal that perfectly
reveals the truth, then she should naturally release it as early as possible so that everyone
can learn the truth from it and choose the right action. This thought experiments casts
doubt on whether the limiting expected payo¤ or the average expected payo¤ is a proper
objective for the social planner, and we reconsider the whole problem assuming that
50In general numerous Bayesian Nash equilibria exist with contingent releasing strategies, so we focus
on a selection of equilibria to make meaningful prediction. See Subsection 2:2:3 for details.
51Note that the monotonicity result is true even for noisy public signals, but does not contradict with
the anti-transparency result: releasing a noisy public signal is bad, but if the social planner were to
release one, she should postpone as much as possible.
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the social planner wants to maximize the discounted sum of peoples expected payo¤s
instead. Although the optimal timing of disclosure is not yet clear to us, we show that
the monotonicity result is no longer true. If the social planner is indi¤erent between two
periods to release the public signal before, now she strictly prefers the earlier period of
the two due to the discount factor.
We also present an alternative setting with ternary states, actions and signals, and
show that the monotonicity result does not hold either. In this setting, at some point
in the history an action could be excluded by all the agents afterwards: e.g., an agent
observing history (A;B;A;B;A;B) would not choose C regardless of her private signal
and neither would all her successors. We call this situation a trap away from action C,
and unlike a herd, the informational depthof a trap can increase over time; hence a
public signal could fail to break down a wrong trap if it is released too late, which is not
what the social planner wants.
Related literature. This paper is related to a stream of papers on anti-transparency.
Morris and Shin (2002) presented a model where every agent wants to minimize a loss
function made up of two components: loss in the distance between her action and the
underlying state, and loss in the distance between her action and the average action in
the population, i.e., a beauty-contestterm.52 With later comments by Svensson (2006)
and Morris et al. (2006), it can be shown that in such a model the welfare with noisy
public information could indeed be worse than the welfare without.53 Demertzis and
Hoeberichts (2007) further explored this anti-transparency result by introducing costly
information acquisition to the model, where people might free-ride on public information
and abandon private information acquisitions. In this paper we get an anti-transparency
result as well in the canonical social-learning model, but without beauty-contest-like
preference or costly information acquisition.54
This work is clearly related to the social learning literature initiated by Banerjee
(1992), Bikhchandani et al. (1992), and Smith and Sørensen (2000). Nevertheless few pa-
pers talked about disclosure of public information in social-learning models. Bikhchan-
52See Keynes (1936).
53In that model, public information serves as a coordination device for the second loss term, and people
could overlook their private signals when they put a su¢ ciently high weight on the second loss term.
54Compared to Morris and Shin (2002), noisy public information distorts social welfare in this model
through informational externality rather than payo¤ interdependence.
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dani et al. (1992) pointed out the fragility of informational cascades and only briey
discussed the e¤ect of releasing extra information, while this work further looks into this
issue and investigates the optimal timing of release. Gill and Sgroi (2008) also augmented
the standard model to allow a principal to provide public information to the agents by
subjecting herself to a test of certain toughness at the beginning.55 On the other hand,
as discussed before, the monotonicity result in this paper might question the plausibility
of limiting e¢ ciency, which is the common objective of interest in most of the literature,
as a good measure of social welfare in social-learning models.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2:2 sets up the canonical
binary model and provides the main result. Section 2:3 discusses settings with impatient
social planner and with ternary states/actions. Section 2:4 concludes.
2.2 A Simple Setting with Binary Choice
2.2.1 Setup and Preliminaries
There is a population of countably innite agents who are exogenously ordered to make
a binary choice sequentially. Each agent is labelled by the period of her turn, t 2 T =
f1; 2; 3; :::g.
The state of the world  is realized out of a binary state space   f1; 1g before
anyone makes the choice, with Prf = 1g = 1=2. After the realization of , every agent t
receives a private signal st 2 f1; 1g and the private signals are conditionally i.i.d. with
Prfst = 1j = 1g = Prfst =  1j =  1g = q 2 (1
2
; 1),
where the precision q is common knowledge to the whole population.
Before exerting her action at 2 A = f1; 1g, agent t is allowed to observe the history
of all her predecessorschoices, ht 2 Ht  f;g [ At 1, where h1  ; denotes the empty
history at period 1. Agents have identical utility function
u(at; ) = 1f=atg
55Essentially the outcome of the test is like a public signal with certain precision (based on the tough-
ness) that is released at the beginning. Note that the principal in Gill and Sgroi (2008) does not have
the same objective of the social planner in this paper though.
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and are assumed to follow their own signal when indi¤erent.
Similar to Chapter 1, we call wt  logq=(1 q)[ Pr(htj=1)Pr(htj= 1) ] the public belief after history
ht.56
This is essentially the canonical model in Bikhchandani et al. (1992) and it is well
known that the Bayesian Nash equilibrium exhibits herd behavior eventually. For the
purpose of future analysis though, let us restate the existing results as lemmata.
Lemma 2.2.1 The Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategy of each agent t is given by
at (ht; st) = a
(wt; st) 
8<: st if jwtj  1sgn(wt) otherwise ,
where sgn(x) 
8<: x= jxj if x 6= 00 otherwise .
Hence, along the equilibrium path ht = (a

1; a

2; :::; a

t 1) with h

1  ;, the dynamic of
public beliefs is given by
w1 = 0; w

t+1 =
8<: wt + at if jwt j  1wt otherwise .
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 2:2:1 shows that public belief wt serves as a su¢ cient statistic for agent ts
decision problem and in equilibrium wt stops to update once it leaves interval [ 1; 1],
which is exactly when an informational cascade, or a herd, starts.
Denition 2.1 We say a herd on action 1( 1) starts at period T if
8t  T , at(ht; st) = at(ht; ) = 1( 1).
Lemma 2.2.2 Along the equilibrium path described by Lemma 2:2:1, a herd starts even-
56Compared to the denition of public belief lt on page 15 of Chapter 1, we only change the base of
the logarithm from e to q1 q here, i.e., a linear transformation. It is convenient to use wt here as it only
takes integer values in equilibrium (prior to the disclosure of public information) and in fact represents
the net number of private signals revealed by the history.
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tually with probability 1.
Proof. See Appendix.
Note that the eventual herd could be incorrect, as Smith and Sørensen (2000) argued,
if agents have bounded private beliefs, which is exactly the case here. The probability of a
correct herd eventually is nevertheless important for our analysis later on social welfare,
as it determines expected payo¤s for future agents in the long run. Hence we would like
to calculate this probability here.
For convenience, let us assume the realization of  is 1 without loss of generality for
the remainder of this section.57 Dene
p(x)  Pr(plimt!1 at (ht ; st) = 1jw1 = x;  = 1), 8x 2 R,
the probability of a correct herd eventually conditional on some initial public belief w1 =
x, which can be explicitly calculated according to the following useful lemma.
Lemma 2.2.3 p(x) can only take the following 7 discrete values:
p(x) = 0  1, 8x <  1;
p( 1) = q
3
1  2q(1  q)  2;
p(x) =
q2
1  q(1  q)  3, 8x 2 ( 1; 0);
p(0) =
q2
1  2q(1  q)  4;
p(x) =
q
1  q(1  q)  5, 8x 2 (0; 1);
p(1) = q +
(1  q)q2
1  2q(1  q)  6;
p(x) = 1  7, 8x > 1.
57It is without loss of generality from an ex-ante perspective due to the symmetric setting.
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In fact,   (1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7)> satises Q =  where
Q 
26666666666666664
1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1  q 0 0 q 0 0 0
1  q 0 0 0 q 0 0
0 1  q 0 0 0 q 0
0 0 1  q 0 0 0 q
0 0 0 1  q 0 0 q
0 0 0 0 0 0 1
37777777777777775
.
Proof. See Appendix.
Note that the subgame starting from a period T is identical to the original game (and
the equilibrium strategy is stationary according to Lemma 2:2:1), hence Lemma 2:2:3
actually tells us how to calculate the probability of a correct herd eventually if the public
belief at period T is wT . On the other hand, the matrix Q introduced in Lemma 2:2:3
also helps us to characterize the equilibrium public beliefs as a monotone Markov chain.
Denition 2.2 A transition matrix C = (cij)nn is monotone if
81  i < j  n;8k  n;
Xk
m=1
cmi 
Xk
m=1
cmj.
A Markov chain is monotone if it has a monotone transition matrix.58
Lemma 2.2.4 Let P = fP1; P2; P3; P4; P5; P6; P7g be a nite partition of R with:
P1 = ( 1; 1), P2 = f 1g, P3 = ( 1; 0), P4 = f0g,
P5 = (0; 1), P6 = f1g, P7 = (1;+1)g.
Dene ti  Pr(wt 2 Pi) and t = (t1; t2; t3; t4; t5; t6; t7) is hence the probability vector
of wt over partition P. We have
t+1 = tQ with 1 = (0; 0; 0; 1; 0; 0; 0),
58These denitions come from Keilson and Kester (1977).
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where the transition matrix Q is given in Lemma 2:2:3 and it is monotone.
Proof. See Appendix.
2.2.2 Exogenous Release of Public Information
As we have seen in the previous subsection, a herd starts eventually but it is possibly on
the wrong action. Bikhchandani et al. (1992) referred to the eventual herd as an infor-
mational cascade and pointed out that it is vulnerable to public information disclosure.
Here we look into this issue more specically by introducing public information release
into the model.
In addition to the population of agents as before, there is a social planner who also
receives a signal es 2 f1; 1g after the realization of  and
Prfes = 1j = 1g = Prfes =  1j =  1g = eq 2 (1
2
; 1).
The precision eq is common knowledge to the whole population and es is conditionally
independent of any st.
The social planner can decide whether and when to release the signal es to the public.
Once es is released at period   1 it becomes public information and every agent after-
wards, t   , can take it into account before she makes her decision. The social planner
wants to maximize the expected average payo¤ of the whole population,
lim
T!1
1
T
TX
t=1
Eu(at ; ).
Note that due to the existence of herd behavior, the social planners objective is essentially
to maximize the probability of a correct herd eventually, or say, the probability of learning
the truth eventually.
In this subsection we particularly consider the situation where the releasing strategy
is exogenous, namely she has to decide a period  2 f1; 2; 3:::g to release or not to release
at all before anything happens and commits to that. Keep in mind that we still assume
the realization of  is 1 without loss of generality.
Note that private signals are equally precise, hence the public belief wt can also be
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interpreted as the net number of correct private signals revealed by history ht. We would
like to rst have a similar interpretation of the public signal by measuring its precision
with respect to private signals:
Denition 2.3 The public signal es has relative precision  2 R+ if
logq=(1 q)[
eq
1  eq ] = , or equivalently, eq = qq + (1  q) .
When the public signal has relative precision , we have
Prfesj = 1g
Prfesj =  1g = ( eq1  eq )es = [( q1  q )]es
= [(
q
1  q )
st ] = [
Pr(stj = 1)
Pr(stj =  1)]
 whenever st = es.
That is, learning a public signal in favor of one state with relative precision  is equivalent
to learning  net private signals in favor of that state.
Now suppose the social planner releases the public signal at period  . Then the
subgame after the release is equivalent to the original game without public information,
which we discussed in the previous subsection, but with an initial public belief inferred
from bother the history before period  and the public signal. Hence, a herd still starts
eventually and the expected average payo¤ of the population is just the probability of
a correct herd eventually, which depends only on the initial public belief according to
Lemma 2:2:3. Meanwhile, using the relative precision, we can linearly describe the e¤ect
of the public signal on the public belief. These observations are summarized in the
following lemma.
Lemma 2.2.5 Suppose the social planner releases es with relative precision  at period
  1 and the history before that has generated a public belief w . Then the new public
belief after release will be ew = w + es,
and (under the assumption that the realization of  is 1) the expected average payo¤ of
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the population conditional on ew is simply given by
plimT!1
1
T
TX
t=1
u(at ;  = 1j ew ) = p( ew ) = p(w + es).
Furthermore, let us denote v( ;) as the (unconditional) expected average payo¤ of the
population when the social planner is to release the public signal with relative precision 
at period  , then
v( ;) = Ew ;es[p(w + es)].
Proof. See Appendix.
Keep in mind that without no release at all, the expected average payo¤ of the pop-
ulation, which is just the probability of a correct herd eventually, is equal to 4 given in
Lemma 2:2:3. Now we are in a position to provide the main result of this section.
Proposition 2.2.1 1. It is never optimal to release a public signal less precise than the
private signals. That is,
8 2 (0; 1), 8  1, v( ;) < 4.
2. It is strictly better to release a public signal no less precise than the private signals
than not to release at all. That is,
8 2 [1;+1), 9 <1 such that v( ;) > 4.
3. It is always (weakly) better to release a public signal later than sooner regardless
of its precision. That is,
8 2 R+, 8  1, v( + 1;)  v( ;).
Proof. See Appendix.
Here we would like to talk about the third statement of Proposition 2:2:1 in partic-
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ular. The weak monotonicity of v( ;) in  mathematically comes from the fact that
equilibrium public beliefs evolve according to a monotone transition matrix until the
public signal is released, regardless of the value of . However, the intuition for this weak
monotonicity is not as universal as the property itself. For illustrative purposes, let us
focus on two cases,  = 1 and  < 1.
We can think of releasing a public signal as an "additional" agent joining in the
sequence who always follows his own private signal es. When  = 1, the release has no
ex-ante e¤ect if a herd has not started yet because every agent t just follows her own
private signal st, which has the same precision as es, before a herd starts. In this case the
ex-ante benet of releasing es arises after a herd starts, where es is more likely to break
down a wrong herd than to break down a correct herd as eq > 1=2. So the benet of
releasing es is increasing in the probability of herding at the time of release. It is easy to
verify that the probability of herding is weakly increasing in t, which explains the weak
monotonicity of v( ;) in  .
When  < 1, however, releasing es has no e¤ect once a herd starts: j ew j = jw+esj > 1
and sgn( ew ) = sgn(w ) when w = 2 and  < 1.59 But it brings ex-ante disadvantage
before a herd starts since it is more likely to induce a wrong herd than what a normal
agent does, due to the lower precision eq < q. Therefore the harm of release is decreasing
in the probability of herding, which in turn is weakly decreasing over time and hence
explains the weak monotonicity of v( ;) in  .
It is worth pointing out that when  > 3, the weak monotonicity is actually uniformity.
In that case, the public signal is so strong that people start to herd on the action same
as the realization of es immediately after it is released, so releasing at di¤erent periods
makes no di¤erence.
2.2.3 Contingent Release of Noisy Public Information
In addition to the monotonicity result, Proposition 2:2:1 also makes another observation:
it is better not to release the public signal at all when it is less precise than private
signals. This can be interpreted as an anti-transparency result: more (but noisy) pub-
59Bikhchandani et al. (1992) argued that releasing a public signal less informative than the private
signal can still be benecial when there is an information cascade. This is true under their assumption
that agents play mixed strategies when indi¤erent, but not under the tie-breaking rule here.
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lic information can be bad for social welfare.60 However, the social planner has so far
been restricted to use exogenous releasing strategies, hence a natural question would be
whether this suboptimality of release when  < 1 still holds if contingent releasing strate-
gies are allowed, namely the social planner can decide whether to release or not at period
t based on the realization of es and wt.
Let g(es; wt) 2 f0; 1g be the strategy of the social planner: g(es; wt) = 1 means the
social planner releases the public signal at period t after seeing es and wt; g(es; wt) = 0
means not. And gt 2 f0; 1g denotes the corresponding action. We restriction attention
on pure strategies by the social planner.
Note that gt is now relevant information for agents   t, because, given a releasing
strategy by the social planner, agents can possibly infer the realization of es from gt and wt.
A natural issue arises here, like in lots of games with incomplete information, that there
could potentially exist undesired equilibria due to lack of restriction on o¤-equilibrium
beliefs. So we want to impose the following renement on certain o¤-equilibrium path.
Denition 2.4 Given a releasing strategy g(es; wt) by the social planner, let (wt; gt)
denote agentsbelief at period t about the realization of es after observing wt and gt. That
is,
(wt; gt)  Pr(es = 1jwt; gt; g(; )).
We say (wt; gt) is non-excessive if
(wt; 0) =
1
2
, 8wt s.t. g(es; wt) = 1 for any es 2 f 1; 1g.
Non-excessive belief requires that, on an o¤-equilibrium path where the social planner
does not release es while she should have released it regardless of its realization, agents
should not make excessive inference about the realization of es in this symmetric world.
We think this is a reasonable renement and it indeed helps us get rid of meaningless
equilibria which do not serve for the purpose of our analysis here.61
60The seminal paper on anti-transparency, Morris and Shin (2002), also used the average payo¤ of the
population to refer to social welfare.
61Without restriction on non-excessive beliefs, one can show that to release the public signal after any
history could be an equilibrium. But these equilibria do not help improve the social welfare.
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Note that the agentsbehavior still follows what has been described in Lemma 2:2:1
but under a public belief generated from both the previous actions and their inference
about es. Hence we will give the main result here that focuses on the social planners
releasing strategy.
Proposition 2.2.2 When  < 1 and agents belief about es is non-excessive, there are
3 Bayesian Nash equilibria where the social planners contingent releasing strategies are
respectively:
g1(es; wt) = 0;
g2(es; wt) = 1fwt= esg;
g3(es; wt) = 1fwt=2esg.
Proof. See Appendix.
The interesting addition compared to the case with exogenous releasing strategy is g2.
With g2, the social planner will release the public signal once he saw an history that is not
a herd yet but against the realization of es, which is reasonable because he wants to prevent
the agents from starting an herd against the public signal too early. Unfortunately,
from an ex-ante perspective, social welfare is not improved under contingent releasing
strategies.
Corollary 2.2.1 g1 generates the same ex-ante average payo¤ of the population in equi-
librium as g3 does, which is better than what g2 does. And none of them can improve
social welfare compared to exogenous releasing strategies.
Proof. g1 means no release at all, which is also the best the social planner can do under
exogenous releasing strategies. g3 means to disclose the public signal when a herd has
already started but in that case disclosure makes no di¤erence as the noisy public signal
can never break down a herd, hence social welfare is the same as with no release at all.
On the other hand, the "separating" strategy g2 implies that the agents can perfectly
infer the realization of es after period 1, hence social welfare is the same as with exogenous
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release at period 2, which is worse than with no release at all when  < 1 as we saw in
Proposition 2:2:1.
2.3 Postponing Disclosure Is Not Always Better
Recall that the benet of public information disclosure is weakly increasing over time in
the binary-choice model. In this section, however, we are about to introduce two alterna-
tive settings under which postponing disclosure of public information is not necessarily a
good decision for the social planner.
2.3.1 Impatient Social Planner
So far we have assumed that the social planner cares about the expected average payo¤
of the population without discounting, hence she essentially cares only about whether
people eventually herd on the correct action or not, i.e., limiting e¢ ciency. Although
limiting e¢ ciency is the common objective of interest in the literature of social learning,
it might not be a plausible measure of social welfare for a social planner.
For example, Proposition 2:2:1 says that the social planner is indi¤erent among all
periods to release a public signal that is su¢ ciently precise. Imagine that the social
planner has a public signal with perfect precision. Then naturally she should release
the public signal as early as possible, because any delay would hurt some earlier agents.
However this natural observation is not captured by the non-discounted average payo¤
as the social planner only cares about people in the limit. Hence in this subsection we
introduce a discount factor  in the social planners objective and reconsider the timing
of information disclosure. In particular, we show that it is not always better to postpone
the release of a public signal.
Formally, with all the other congurations identical to the benchmark model, we
assume the social planner now wants to maximize the discounted sum of peoples expected
payo¤,
(1  )
1X
t=1
t 1Eu(at ; ).
For simplicity we restrict attention on exogenous releasing strategies and assume the
public signal has the same precision q as the private signals.
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Claim 2.3.1 Let V () be the discounted sum of peoples expected payo¤ when the public
signal is released at period  . Then 8q 2 (1
2
; 1), V (3) > V (4).
Proof. See Appendix.
In the benchmark without discounting, the social planner is indi¤erent between re-
leasing at period 3 and at period 4.62 Hence with discounting it is not surprising to see
that the social planner now strictly prefers to release the public signal at periods 3 than
period 4. The optimal timing of disclosure with discounting is yet to be explicitly char-
acterized, nevertheless we present this example mainly to bring up the concern for the
plausibility of treating limiting e¢ ciency as the main objective in social-learning models.
2.3.2 Ternary Setting
In this subsection we expand the binary setting in the benchmark model and allow the
state/action/signal space to have three elements.63 Under this new setting, even for a
patient social planner who only cares about limiting e¢ ciency as in the benchmark model,
it is not always better to postpone the disclosure of public information.
Formally, the state of the world  is realized out of fL;M;Rg with
Pr( = L) = Pr( = M) = Pr( = R) = 1=3.
After the realization of  , every agent t receives a private signal st 2 fL;M;Rg and the
private signals are conditionally i.i.d. with
Prfst = Lj = Lg = Prfst = M j = Mg = Prfst = Rj = Rg = q 2 (1
3
; 1);
Prfst = Lj = Mg = Prfst = Rj = Mg = Prfst = M j = Rg =
Prfst = Lj = Rg = Prfst = Rj = Lg = Prfst = M j = Lg = 1  q
2
.
Each agent chooses at from fL;M;Rg and observes the history of past actions ht 
(a1; a2; : : : ; at 1). They have identical utility function u(at; ) = 1f =atg, and note that
this degenerate utility function implies that the three states cannot be linearly ordered,
62See the proof of Proposition 2:2:1 for details.
63Ternary spaces are su¢ cient to capture the intuition we want to describe, yet not too complicated
for analysis.
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unlike many other economic models with multiple states.64
With ternary spaces, we want to specify a tie-breaking rule:
at (ht; st) = st if st 2 arg max
a2fL;M;Rg
E [u(a; )jht; st],
at (ht; st) = at 1 if arg max
a2fL;M;Rg
E [u(a; )jht; st] = 	nfstg.
Namely, agent t follows st if it is one of the maximizers and chooses to follow her immediate
predecessor if the two actions di¤erent from st are both maximizers.65
Again there is a social planner who receives a signal es 2 fL;M;Rg and decide
whether/when to release it to the public. Here for simplicity es is assumed to be equally
precise as the private signals. The (patient) social planners objective is still to maximize
the ex-ante average payo¤ of the population and we restriction attention on exogenous
releasing strategies only in this subsection.
Before making further observations, we would like to introduce an idea similar to herd
behavior:
Denition 2.5 8a 2 fL;M;Rg, a trap away from action a starts at period T if at(ht; ) 6=
a for all t  T .
It is easy to see that a trap away from one action is equivalent to a herd on the other
action in the binary model. However, with ternary spaces, a herd on action a0 6= a is a
trap away from action a, but not vice versa. And the di¤erence between a herd and a
trap is exactly what drives the following result that the benet of releasing the public
signal is no longer weakly monotone over time.
Claim 2.3.2 Let G be the ex-ante average payo¤ of the population with no release at all,
and let G() be the ex-ante average payo¤ of the population if the public signal is released
at period   1. Then 8q 2 (1
3
; 1), G(3) > G and G(4) > G(5).
Proof. See Appendix.
64Specically, the degenerate utility function rules out the scenario where an agent believes one state,
say M , is more likely after observing an action L and an action R. This setting, though complicates the
analysis, is crucial for the result we will present in this subsection.
65The specication itself is not very important; we just want a tie-breaking rule to guarantee deter-
ministic outcomes and hence tractability.
64
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 .3 6 4
0 .3 6 6
0 .3 6 8
0 .3 7
0 .3 7 2
0 .3 7 4
0 .3 7 6
0 .3 7 8
0 .3 8
q = 0:35
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 .5 6
0 .5 6 5
0 .5 7
0 .5 7 5
0 .5 8
0 .5 8 5
0 .5 9
0 .5 9 5
0 .6
q = 0:45
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 .7 3
0 .7 3 5
0 .7 4
0 .7 4 5
0 .7 5
0 .7 5 5
0 .7 6
0 .7 6 5
0 .7 7
0 .7 7 5
0 .7 8
q = 0:55
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 .9 0 5
0 .9 1
0 .9 1 5
0 .9 2
0 .9 2 5
0 .9 3
0 .9 3 5
0 .9 4
0 .9 4 5
q = 0:7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 .9 6 6
0 .9 6 8
0 .9 7
0 .9 7 2
0 .9 7 4
0 .9 7 6
0 .9 7 8
0 .9 8
0 .9 8 2
0 .9 8 4
0 .9 8 6
q = 0:8
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 .9 9 3
0 .9 9 4
0 .9 9 5
0 .9 9 6
0 .9 9 7
0 .9 9 8
0 .9 9 9
1
q = 0:9
Figure 2: Non-monotone G() under di¤erent values of q.
G(3) > G is not a surprising: the public signal is equally precise as a private signal,
so releasing it would not bring any harm but could possibly break down a wrong herd
starting at period 3, if the rst two actions are the same but wrong.66 Meanwhile we
lose weak monotonicity as G(4) > G(5) for the following reason: releasing es at period
4 is possible to break down a trap away from true state  if es =  , no matter what
h3 is; however, if  = R but h4 = (L;M;L; L), the trap away from R could not be
broken down even if es = R as long as it is released at period 5. In general, weak
monotonicity fails here because the existence of traps rather than herds: a trap is not
necessarily an informational cascade and information can still aggregate over time for the
two "surviving" actions before a herd nally starts, hence the social planner could face
the danger of not being able to break down a wrong trap if the public signal is released
too late.
On the other hand, the optimal timing of release is unclear to us and in principal it
shall depends on the value of q. See Figure 2 for some examples.
66It is not di¢ cult to see that a herd will arise when, in the history, the number of one action is larger
than the number of the other two actions by at least 2.
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2.4 Conclusions
In this paper we look into the e¤ect of public information disclosure on social learning. In
the canonical binary model, if a social planner were to choose a certain period to release
a public signal, she should release it as late as possible regardless of the precision of the
public signal: a monotonicity result. Meanwhile, when the public signal is less precise
than peoples private signals, releasing it would do no good on social welfare even if the
timing of release can be contingent on the history of actions: an anti-transparency result.
We present two alternative settings where the monotonicity result no longer holds.
Postponing the information disclosure could be bad for a social planner, if her objective
is the discounted sum of peoples expected payo¤s, or if the state/action spaces are
richer. Solving the optimal timing of disclosure in these two settings is a challenging but
interesting follow-up to this work.
As to the anti-transparency result, a relevant and interesting question is: what is the
lower bound of the (relative) precision of a public signal that could improve social welfare
once released in a more general setting, e.g., agents have private signals of heterogeneous
precision? Some preliminary work suggests that this lower bound is lower and could be
substantially lower than the averageprecision of peoples private signals.
We treat this work as a contribution to the literature on social learning, with a
particular focus on exogenous information intervention. Perhaps more importantly, we
hope this work can also raise attention on welfare control or optimal design of social
learning under di¤erent settings.
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2.5 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2:2:1. By standard Bayesian Nash equilibrium denition and the
tie-breaking rule,
at (ht; st)
= arg max
a2f1; 1g
E(1f=agjht; st) = arg max
a2f1; 1g
Pr( = ajht; st)
=
8<: st if Pr( = 1jht; st) = Pr( =  1jht; st)sgn(Pr( = 1jht; st)  Pr( =  1jht; st)) otherwise .
By BayesRule and uniform prior,
Pr( = 1jht; st) = Pr(ht; stj = 1)
Pr(ht; stj = 1) + Pr(ht; stj =  1) = 1  Pr( =  1jht; st)
) sgn(Pr( = 1jht; st)  Pr( =  1jht; st)) = sgn(Pr(ht; stj = 1)  Pr(ht; stj =  1))
) at (ht; st)
=
8<: st if Pr(ht; stj = 1) = Pr(ht; stj =  1)sgn(Pr(ht; stj = 1)  Pr(ht; stj =  1)) otherwise .
By denition of wt and independence between st and ht,
Pr(ht; stj = 1)
Pr(ht; stj =  1) =
Pr(htj = 1)
Pr(htj =  1)
Pr(stj = 1)
Pr(stj =  1)
= (
q
1  q )
wt(
q
1  q )
st = (
q
1  q )
wt+st, where
q
1  q > 1
) sgn(Pr(ht; stj = 1)  Pr(ht; stj =  1)) = sgn(wt + st) =
8<: st or 0 if jwtj  1sgn(wt) otherwise ,
hence we get at (ht; st) characterized in the Lemma.
On the other hand, apparently w1 = 0 and by denition of w

t ,
(
q
1  q )
wt+1 =
Pr(ht+1j = 1)
Pr(ht+1j =  1)
=
Pr(ht ; atj = 1)
Pr(ht ; atj =  1)
=
Pr(ht j = 1)
Pr(ht j =  1)
Pr(at jht ;  = 1)
Pr(at jht ;  =  1)
= (
q
1  q )
wt
Pr(at jht ;  = 1)
Pr(at jht ;  =  1)
.
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Meanwhile, if jwt j  1,
at = st )
Pr(at jht ;  = 1)
Pr(at jht ;  =  1)
=
Pr(stjht ;  = 1)
Pr(stjht ;  =  1)
=
Pr(stj = 1)
Pr(stj =  1) = (
q
1  q )
st
) wt+1 = wt + st = wt + at ;
otherwise,
at = sgn(w

t ) )
Pr(at jht ;  = 1)
Pr(at jht ;  =  1)
=
Pr(sgn(wt )jht ;  = 1)
Pr(sgn(wt )jht ;  =  1)
= 1
) wt+1 = wt .
Proof of Lemma 2:2:2. According to Lemma 2:2:1 and Denition 2:1, a herd on action
sgn(wt ) starts at period t if and only if jwt j > 1. Note that
8t 2 N, jwt j  1 )
8<: 8k 2 N, a2k 1 + a2k = 08t 2 N, at = st
) 8k 2 N, s2k 1 + s2k = 0.
Hence a herd starts eventually unless s2k 1 + s2k = 0, 8k 2 N. However,
Pr(8k 2 N, s2k 1 =  s2k)  1  Pr(9k0 2 N s.t. sk0 = sk0+1 = sk0+2)
= 1  E[Pr(9k0 2 N s.t. sk0 = sk0+1 = sk0+2j)] = 1  1 = 0,
where 8 2 , Pr(9k0 2 N s.t. sk0 = sk0+1 = sk0+2j) = 1 due to fstg1t=1 being conditional
i.i.d. and Law of Large Numbers.
Proof of Lemma 2:2:3. By Lemma 2:2:1, a herd starts in equilibrium when jwt j > 1
and the herd is correct(wrong) if wt > 1(<  1). Then we can immediately see that
1 = 0 and 7 = 1. For the remaining cases, let us look into the transition of wt . (Recall
that we have assumed that the realization of  is 1 without loss of generality)
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If w1 = 0,
a1 = s1 and w

2 = s1
) Pr(w2 = 1jw1 = 0) = Pr(s1 = 1) = q,
Pr(w2 =  1jw1 = 0) = Pr(s1 =  1) = 1  q.
Note that 8T <1 (especially T = 2 here),
p(x)  Pr(plimt!1 at (ht ; st) = jw1 = x)
= Pr(plimt!1 a

t (h

t ; st) = jwT = x)
since the subgame starting from agent T is identical to the original game, thus we have
4 = (1  q)2 + q6. Through similar arguments,
Pr(w2 = 2jw1 = 1) = q and Pr(w2 = 0jw1 = 1) = 1  q
) 6 = q7 + (1  q)4 = q + (1  q)4;
Pr(w2 = 0jw1 =  1) = q and Pr(w2 =  2jw1 =  1) = 1  q
) 2 = q4 + (1  q)1 = q4.
Solve the three linear equations together to get 2, 4 and 6 as stated in the Lemma.
If w1 = x 2 ( 1; 0),
a1 = s1 and w

2 = x+ s1
) Pr(w2 = x+ 1 2 (0; 1)jw1 = x) = q,
Pr(w2 = x  1 <  1jw1 = x) = 1  q
) 3 = q5 + (1  q)1 = q5;
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through similar argument,
Pr(w2 = x
0 + 1 > 1jw1 = x0 2 (0; 1)) = q,
Pr(w2 = x
0   1 2 ( 1; 0)jw1 = x0 2 (0; 1)) = 1  q
) 5 = q7 + (1  q)3 = q + (1  q)3.
Solve the two linear equations together to get 3 and 5 as stated in the Lemma.
Combing all these linear equations together, we have exactlyQ = . In other words,
 is an eigenvector of P associated with eigenvalue 1, with restriction that 7 = 1 and
1 = 0.
Proof of Lemma 2:2:4. 1 = (0; 0; 0; 1; 0; 0; 0) simply because w1 = 0. As to the tran-
sition between wt to w

t+1, it is identical to the transition between w

1 and w

2 illustrated
in the proof of Lemma 2:2:3:
Pr(wt+1 > 1jwt > 1) = 1, Pr(wt+1 <  1jwt <  1) = 1;
Pr(wt+1 = 1jwt = 0) = q, Pr(wt+1 =  1jwt = 0) = 1  q;
Pr(wt+1 = 2jwt = 1) = q, Pr(wt+1 = 0jwt = 1) = 1  q;
Pr(wt+1 = 0jwt =  1) = q, Pr(wt+1 =  2jwt = 0) = 1  q;
Pr(wt+1 2 (0; 1)jwt 2 ( 1; 0)) = q, Pr(wt+1 <  1jwt 2 ( 1; 0)) = 1  q;
Pr(wt+1 > 1jwt 2 (0; 1)) = q, Pr(wt+1 2 ( 1; 0)jwt 2 (0; 1)) = 1  q.
Therefore the transition matrix is exactly matrix Q, which is indeed monotone according
to Denition 2:2.
Note that by Lemma 2:2:1, wt can only take values 2, 1 and 0, hence t3 = t5 = 0
for any t and wt > 1(<  1) indicates wt = 2( 2).
Proof of Lemma 2:2:5. By denition of public beliefs,
(
q
1  q )
w =
Pr(h j = 1)
Pr(h j =  1) and (
q
1  q )
ew = Pr(h ; esj = 1)
Pr(h ; esj =  1) .
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Since ht and es are independent,
(
q
1  q )
ew = Pr(h ; esj = 1)
Pr(h ; esj =  1)
=
Pr(h j = 1)
Pr(h j =  1) 
Pr(esj = 1)
Pr(esj =  1)
= (
q
1  q )
w (
eq
1  eq )es = ( q1  q )w ( q1  q )es.
Hence we have ew = w + es.
On the other hand,
plimT!1
1
T
TX
t=1
u(at ;  = 1j ew )
= plimT 0!1
1
T 0
+T 0X
t=
u(at ;  = 1j ew )
= Pr(plimt!1 a

t = 1jw1 = ew ) = p( ew ),
where the last equation comes from Lemma 2:2:3. Finally, the (unconditional) expected
average payo¤ is just
v( ;) = E ewp( ew ) = Ew ;es[p(w + es)].
Proof of Proposition 2:2:1. For   1, let e = (e1; e2; e3; e4; e5; e6; e7) be the
probability vector of ew on the partition P introduced in Lemma 2:2:3. Then by Lemma
2:2:3 we have
E ew (p( ew )) = e .
Note that the public information is irrelevant for agents before period  so in equilibrium
wt for t   still evolves according to Lemma 2:2:4. Bearing in mind as well that es is
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independent of wt and distributed according to
Prfes = 1j = 1g = Prfes =  1j =  1g = eq,
we can derive e explicitly and prove the proposition case by case on  as follows: (we
then omit the argument  in v(; ) in each case)
Case I ( 0 <  < 1, 1
2
< eq < q)
ew1 = w1 + es and 1 = (0; 0; 0; 1; 0; 0; 0)
) e1 = (0; 0; 1  eq; 0; eq; 0; 0)
) v(1) = eq5 + (1  eq)3 = eqq + q2(1  eq)
1  q(1  q) <
2q2   q3
1  q(1  q) < 4;ew2 = w2 + es and 2 = (0; 1  q; 0; 0; 0; 0; q; 0)
) e1 = ((1  q)(1  eq); 0; (1  q)eq; 0; q(1  eq); 0; qeq)
) v(2) = (1  q)eq3 + q(1  eq)5 + qeq = qeq + q2(1  eq)
1  q(1  q) = v(1) < 4;ew = w + es and  = 2q(1  q) 2 + ((1  q)2; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; q2) for   3
) e = 2q(1  q)e 2 + ((1  q)2; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; q2);
) v() = 2q(1  q)v(   2) + q2
) sgn(v( + 1)  v()) = sgn(v(   1)  v(   2)).
If v(   2) < 4 = q
2
1  2q(1  q)
) v(   2) < 2q(1  q)v(   2) + q2 = v() < 2q(1  q)4 + q2 = 4
) v(1) = v(2) < v(3) = v(4) < 4.
Recursively we have v(1) = v(2) < v(3) = v(4) < v(5) = v(6) <    and v() < 4 for
any   1.
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Case II ( = 1, eq = q)
ew1 = w1 + es and 1 = (0; 0; 0; 1; 0; 0; 0)
) e1 = (0; 1  eq; 0; 0; 0; eq; 0)
) v(1) = eq6 + (1  eq)2 = q(q + (1  q)q2
1  2q(1  q)) +
(1  q)q3
1  2q(1  q) = 4;ew2 = w2 + es and 2 = (0; 1  q; 0; 0; 0; 0; q; 0)
) e2 = ((1  q)(1  eq); 0; 0; (1  q)eq + q(1  eq); 0; ; 0; qeq)
) v(2) = [(1  q)eq + q(1  eq)]4 + qeq = 2q(1  q)4 + q2 = 4;
ew = w + es and  = 2q(1  q) 2 + ((1  q)2; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; q2) for   3
) e = 2q(1  q)e 2 + ((1  eq)(1  q)2; eq(1  q)2; 0; 0; 0; (1  eq)q2; eqq2)
) v() = 2q(1  q)v(   2) + eq(1  q)22 + (1  eq)q26 + eqq2 =
2q(1  q)v(   2) + (1  q)q4 + q3 > 2q(1  q)v(   2) + q2
) sgn(v( + 1)  v()) = sgn(v(   1)  v(   2)).
If v(   2)  4 ) v() > 2q(1  q)v(   2) + q2  4
) v(4) = v(3) > v(2) = v(1) = 4.
Recursively we have 4 = v(1) = v(2) < v(3) = v(4) < v(5) = v(6) <    .
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Case III ( 1 <  < 2, q < eq < q2
q2+(1 q)2 = 4)
ew1 = w1 + es and 1 = (0; 0; 0; 1; 0; 0; 0)
) e1 = (1  eq; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; eq)
) v(1) = eq < 4;
ew2 = w2 + es and 2 = (0; 1  q; 0; 0; 0; 0; q; 0)
) e2 = ((1  q)(1  eq); 0; q(1  eq); 0; (1  q)eq; 0; qeq)
) v(2) = (1  q)eq5 + q(1  eq)3 + qeq = 2q(1  q)eq + q3
1  q(1  q)
) v(2)  v(1) = q
3(1  eq)  (1  q)3eq
1  q(1  q) > 0 as eq < 4 < q3q3 + (1  q)3 ;ew = w + es and  = 2q(1  q) 2 + ((1  q)2; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; q2) for   3
) e = 2q(1  q)e 2 + ((1  eq)(1  q)2; 0; eq(1  q)2; 0; (1  eq)q2; 0; eqq2)
) v() = 2q(1  q)v(   2) + eq(1  q)23 + (1  eq)q25 + eqq2
) sgn(v( + 1)  v()) = sgn(v(   1)  v(   2)).
v(3) = 2q(1  q)v(1) + eq(1  q)23 + (1  eq)q25 + eqq2 with v(1) = eq
) v(3)  v(2) = q(1  q)eq   eq(1  q)q = 0) v(3) = v(2) > v(1).
Recursively we have v(1) < v(2) = v(3) < v(4) = v(5) < v(6) <    . As the sequence
fv()g1=1 is weakly monotonic and bounded between 0 and 1, lim!1 v() exists and it
satises
lim
!1
v() = 2q(1  q) lim
!1
v() + eq(1  q)23 + (1  eq)q25 + eqq2
) lim
!1
v() =
eq(1  q)23 + (1  eq)q25 + eqq2
1  2q(1  q) >
q(1  q)23 + (1  q)q25 + q3
1  2q(1  q) >
q2
1  2q(1  q) = 4.
Thus 9T <1 s.t. v(T ) > 4.
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Case IV ( = 2, eq = q2
q2+(1 q)2 = 4)
Similar to Case III, we have v(1) = eq = 4;
ew2 = w2 + es and 2 = (0; 1  q; 0; 0; 0; 0; q; 0)
) e2 = ((1  q)(1  eq); q(1  eq); 0; 0; 0; (1  q)eq; qeq)
) v(2) = (1  q)eq6 + q(1  eq)2 + qeq = (1  q)46 + q(1  4)2 + q4 =
4[4 + 2q(1  4)] > 4;
ew = w + es and  = 2q(1  q) 2 + ((1  q)2; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; q2) for   3
) e = 2q(1  q)e 2 + ((1  eq)(1  q)2; 0; 0; eq(1  q)2 + (1  eq)q2; 0; 0; eqq2)
) v() = 2q(1  q)v(   2) + [eq(1  q)2 + (1  eq)q2]4 + eqq2
) sgn(v( + 1)  v()) = sgn(v(   1)  v(   2)).
v(3) = 2q(1  q)v(1) + [eq(1  q)2 + (1  eq)q2]4 + eqq2 with v(1) = eq = 4
) v(3) = [2q(1  q) + 4(1  q)2 + (1  4)q2 + q2]4 = v(2) > v(1).
Recursively we have 4 = v(1) < v(2) = v(3) < v(4) = v(5) < v(6) =    .
Case V ( 2 <  < 3, 4 = q2q2+(1 q)2 < eq < q3q3+(1 q)3 )
Similar to Case III, we have v(1) = eq > 4;
ew2 = w2 + es and 2 = (0; 1  q; 0; 0; 0; 0; q; 0)
) e2 = ((1  eq); 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; eq)
) v(2) = eq = v(1);
ew = w + es and  = 2q(1  q) 2 + ((1  q)2; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; q2) for   3
) e = 2q(1  q)e 2 + ((1  eq)(1  q)2; 0; (1  eq)q2; 0; eq(1  q)2; 0; eqq2)
) v() = 2q(1  q)U(   2) + eq(1  q)25 + (1  eq)q23 + eqq2
) sgn(v( + 1)  v()) = sgn(v(   1)  v(   2)).
v(3) = 2q(1  q)v(1) + eq(1  q)25 + (1  eq)q23 + eqq2 with v(1) = eq
) v(3)  eq =  (1  q)2eq + 5(1  q)2eq + (1  eq)3q2 = q4(1  eq)  (1  q)4eq
1  q(1  q) > 0
) v(3) > eq = v(2) = v(1).
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Recursively we have 4 < v(1) = v(2) < v(3) = v(4) < v(5) = v(6) <    .
Case VI ( = 3, eq = q3
q3+(1 q)3 )
Similar to Case V, we have v(1) = v(2) = eq > 4;
ew = w + es and  = 2q(1  q) 2 + ((1  q)2; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; q2) for   3
) e = 2q(1  q)e 2 + ((1  eq)(1  q)2; (1  eq)q2; 0; 0; 0; eq(1  q)2; eqq2)
) v() = 2q(1  q)v(   2) + eq(1  q)26 + (1  eq)q22 + eqq2
) sgn(v( + 1)  v()) = sgn(v(   1)  v(   2)).
v(3) = 2q(1  q)v(1) + eq(1  q)26 + (1  eq)q22 + eqq2 with v(1) = eq
) v(3)  eq =  (1  q)2eq + 6(1  q)2eq + (1  eq)2q2 = q5(1  eq)  (1  q)5eq
1  2q(1  q) > 0
) v(3) > eq = v(2) = v(1).
Recursively we have 4 < v(1) = v(2) < v(3) = v(4) < v(5) = v(6) <    .
Case VII ( > 3, eq > q3
q3+(1 q)3 )
8  1, ew = w + es with jw j  2 by Lemma 2:2:1
) j ew j > 1 and sgn( ew ) = sgn(es) as  > 3
) e = ((1  eq); 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; eq)
) v() = eq > 4.
Thus we have 4 < v(1) = v(2) = v(3) = v(4) =    .
Proof of Proposition 2:2:2. Firstly, note that before the period when the social planner
would release the signal according to his releasing strategy, the equilibrium public belief
wt still evolves according to Lemma 2:2:1 and w

t 2 f 2; 1; 0; 1; 2g. Thus for the social
planner, whether to release the public signal or not depends on just ve scenarios:
wt = 2es, wt = es, wt = 0, wt =  es, wt =  2es.
Note also that once the public signal is released or fully inferred by the agents, the
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subgame after that is just the standard case without public information but with an
initial public belief bwt = wt + es, and social welfare is just p( bwt) according to Lemma
2:2:3 as a herd starts eventually.
Suppose agents believe g(es; wt) = 0 is the releasing strategy of the social planner:
If wt = 2es
) releasing es would not break down the herd since 0 <  < 1
) makes no di¤erence.
If wt = 0
) releasing es makes bwt = es
) g(es) = eq5 + (1  eq)3 < 4 as eq < q;
without release, bwt = wt = 0
) g(0) = 4 ) not a protable deviation.
If wt = es
) releasing es makes bwt = (+ 1)es
) p( bwt) = eqqeqq + (1  q)(1  eq)7 + (1  eq)(1  q)eqq + (1  q)(1  eq)1 = eqqeqq + (1  q)(1  eq) ;
without release, bwt = wt = es
) p( bwt) = eqqeqq + (1  q)(1  eq)6 + (1  eq)(1  q)eqq + (1  q)(1  eq)2
>
eqqeqq + (1  q)(1  eq) as eq < q
) not a protable deviation.
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If wt =  es
) releasing es makes bwt = (  1)es
) p( bwt) = eq(1  q)eq(1  q) + q(1  eq)3 + q(1  eq)eq(1  q) + q(1  eq)5;
without release, bwt = wt =  es
) p( bwt) = eq(1  q)eq(1  q) + q(1  eq)2 + q(1  eq)eq(1  q) + q(1  eq)6;eq(1  q)eq(1  q) + q(1  eq)(2   3)  q(1  eq)eq(1  q) + q(1  eq)(5   6)
=
qeq(1  q) + q(1  eq) q1  q(1  q) (1  q)21  2q(1  q) [q2(1  eq)  eq(1  q)2]
> 0 as eq < q2
q2 + (1  q)2
) not a protable deviation.
Therefore g1(es; wt) = 0 is indeed an equilibrium strategy of the social planner.
Suppose agents believe g(es; wt) = 1fwt=2esg is the releasing strategy of the social
planner:
If releasing, bwt = wt + es and j bwtj > 1
) p( bwt) = sgn( bwt) = sgn(wt );
if no release
) by Bayes Rule, bwt = wt   es and j bwtj > 1
) p( bwt) = sgn( bwt) = sgn(wt )
) makes no di¤erence;
if not to release when wt = 2es but releasing later at t0 > t
) by Bayes Rule, bwk = wt   es and j bwkj > 1 for k = t; t+ 1; : : : ; t0   1,bwt0 = bwt0 1 + 2es = wt + es and j bwt0j > 1
) p( bwt0) = sgn( bwt0) = sgn(wt )
) makes no di¤erence.
Note that to release earlier at t00 < t when jwt00 j  1 is also not protable because the
original strategy at t00 is not to release until wt = 2es later, which is equivalent to not to
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release at all since  < 1 and has been shown above to give better outcome. Therefore
g3(es; wt) = 1fwt=2esg is indeed an equilibrium strategy of the social planner.
Suppose agents believe g(es; wt)  1fwt=0g is the releasing strategy of the social planner:
If releasing, bwt = es
) p( bwt) = eq5 + (1  eq)3 < 4;
if no release at all
) by non-excessive belief, bwt = 0 and p(0) = 4;
) it is a protable deviation.
Therefore g(es; wt)  1fwt=0g is not an equilibrium strategy of the social planner.
Suppose agents believe g(es; wt) = 1fwt=esg is the releasing strategy of the social planner:
If releasing, bwt = (1 + )es
) p( bwt) = eqqeqq + (1  q)(1  eq) ;
if no release
) by Bayes Rule, bwt = (1  )es
) p( bwt) = eqqeqq + (1  q)(1  eq)5 + (1  eq)(1  q)eqq + (1  q)(1  eq)3
>
eqqeqq + (1  q)(1  eq) as eq < q
) it is a protable deviation.
Therefore g(es; wt) = 1fwt=esg is not an equilibrium strategy of the social planner.
Suppose agents believe g(es; wt) = 1fwt= esg is the releasing strategy of the social plan-
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ner:
If releasing, bwt = (  1)es
) p( bwt) = eq(1  q)eq(1  q) + q(1  eq)3 + q(1  eq)eq(1  q) + q(1  eq)5;
if no release
) by Bayes Rule, bwt =  (1 + )es
) p( bwt) = eq(1  q)eq(1  q) + q(1  eq)1 + q(1  eq)eq(1  q) + q(1  eq)7
=
q(1  eq)eq(1  q) + q(1  eq) < eq(1  q)eq(1  q) + q(1  eq)3 + q(1  eq)eq(1  q) + q(1  eq)5 as eq < q
) not a protable deviation;
if not to release when wt =  es but releasing later at t0 > t
) by Bayes Rule, bwk =  (1 + )es for k = t; t+ 1; : : : ; t0   1 and
bwt0 = bwt0 1 + 2es = (  1)es
) p( bwt0) = eq(1  q)eq(1  q) + q(1  eq)3 + q(1  eq)eq(1  q) + q(1  eq)5 ) makes no di¤erence;
if instead releasing earlier at t00 < t when wt00 = 0
) bwt00 = es and p( bwt00) = eq5 + (1  eq)3;
at t00 the original strategy is not to release until wt =  es later
) agents can perfectly infer es at t00 + 1 since wt00+1 = 1
) bwt00+1 = wt00+1 + es and
p( bwt00+1) = eq[q7 + (1  q)3] + (1  eq)[q5 + (1  q)1] = eq5 + (1  eq)3
) makes no di¤erence;
if instead releasing earlier at t000 < t when wt000 = es
) bwt000 = (1 + )es and p( bwt000) = eqqeqq + (1  q)(1  eq) ;
at t000 the original strategy is not to release but agents can infer es = wt000
) makes no di¤erence.
Therefore g(es; wt) = 1fwt= esg is indeed an equilibrium strategy of the social planner.
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Proof of Claim 2:3:1. We start by calculating the discounted sum of peoples expected
payo¤s without any public information, V . Without loss of generality, we assume  = 1
and use EUt  Eu(at ;  = 1) to simplify the notation. Then V = (1  )
P1
t=1 
t 1EUt.
Recursive calculation similar to the proof of Proposition 2:2:1 yields
EU1 = EU2 = q,
EU3 = EU4 = q
2 + 2q(1  q)EU1,
  
EU2k+1 = EU2k+2 = q
2 + 2q(1  q)EU2k 1.
Hence
EU2k+1 = [2q(1  q)]k[q   q
2
(1  q)2 + q2 ] +
q2
(1  q)2 + q2 ;
V = (1  )
1X
k=0
(2k + 2k+1)EU2k+1 =
2q2 + (1  2)q
1  22q(1  q) > q.
If the public signal is released at period 1,
EU1 = q,
EU2 = EU3 = q
2 + 2q(1  q)EU1,
  
EU2k = EU2k+1 = q
2 + 2q(1  q)EU2k 1.
Compared to the case without public information, we have
V (1) =
V   (1  )q

> V as V > q.
Clearly there is no di¤erence between releasing at period 1 and at period 2, so V (2) =
V (1) > V .
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If the public signal is released at period 3,
EU1 = EU2 = q;
with probability q3, a correct herd starts after the release;
with probability (1  q)3, a wrong herd starts after the release;
with probability 3q(1  q), it is as if only the public signal is released for agents t  3.
Hence
V (3) = (1  )(q + q) + (1  )q3 
2
1   + 3q(1  q)
2V (1)
= (1  2)q + q32 + 3q(1  q)2V (1).
If the public signal is released at period 4,
EU1 = EU2 = q; EU3 = q2 + 2q(1  q)EU1;
with prob. q3, a correct herd starts after the release;
with prob. (1  q)3, a wrong herd starts after the release;
with prob. q(1  q), it is as if only the public signal is released for agents t  4.
with prob. 2q(1  q), the public signal is as if released after one action for agents t  4.
Hence
V (4) = (1  )(q + q + 2q2) + (1  )q3 
3
1   + q(1  q)
3V (1) + 2q(1  q)2V (2)
= (1  2)q + (1  )2q2 + q33 + 2q(1  q)(2 + 
3
2
)V (1).
Therefore,
V (3)  V (4) = q32(1  )  (1  )2q2 + q(1  q)2(1  )V (1)
= q(1  q)2(1  )[V (1)  q] > 0 as V (1) > V > q.
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Proof of Claim 2:3:2. Note that there would still be a herd eventually due to bounded
private beliefs, so the ex-ante average payo¤ of the population is again the probability of
a correct herd eventually.
Let us rst calculate G, the probability of a correct herd eventually without any public
information. Using similar recursive arguments as in the proof of Proposition 2:2:1 but
with more tedious algebra, we have
G = 6q(
1  q
2
)2G+ q2 + 4q
1  q
2
q
1 + q
2
+ 4q2(
1  q
2
)2(A+B),
where A and B are given by8<: A = q
1+q
2
+ q 1 q
2
A+ (1  q)qB
B = (1+q
2
)2 + 1+q
2
1 q
2
A+ 1 q
2
qB
.
A and B are in fact the probabilities of a correct herd conditional on the event that a
trap has started corresponding to two di¤erent tie-breaking situations.
It is easy to see that G(1) = G(2) = G, because without the public signal the rst
two agents always follow their own private signals and releasing es is just "adding" an
agent who always follow her signal, which does not a¤ect social welfare from an ex-ante
perspective. By exploring all possible situations of the rst two actions, the value of G(3)
can be calculated as follows:
G(3) = q2[q + 2
1  q
2
(
1 + q
2
+
1  q
2
A)] + 2(
1  q
2
)2q2B
+2(
1  q
2
)2qG+ 4q
1  q
2
[q(
1 + q
2
+
1  q
2
A) +
1  q
2
G+
1  q
2
qB]
) G(3) G = q2(1  q)[1 + q
2
+
1  q
2
(A+B)  1] > 0 as A+B > 1.
For G(4) and G(5), if the rst three actions cancel each other then it is as if the public
signal were released three periods earlier; otherwise either a trap or a herd starts and
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calculations similar to those above can be applied. Indeed we have
G(4) = 6q(
1  q
2
)2G(1) + 2q2(
1  q
2
)2B + q2[q + 2
1  q
2
(
1 + q
2
+
1  q
2
A)]
+4q3
1  q
2
+ 4q2(
1  q
2
)2A
+4q2(
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2
)2[q + 2
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2
(
1  q
2
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1  q
2
qB + q
1 + q
2
+ q
1  q
2
A)]
+4(
1  q
2
)3q[
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2
qG+ q(
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2
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A)]g;
G(5) = 6q(
1  q
2
)2G(2) + 2q2(
1  q
2
)2B + q2[q + 2
1  q
2
(
1 + q
2
+
1  q
2
A)]
+4(
1  q
2
)3
1  q
2
q2G
+4(
1  q
2
)q2
1  q
2
(q
1 + q
2
+ q
1  q
2
A+ q
1  q
2
B +
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2
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+4(
1  q
2
)q2
1 + q
2
[q +
1  q
2
+
1  q
2
(
1  q
2
A+
1  q
2
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+4(
1  q
2
)2q[q(q
1 + q
2
+ q
1  q
2
A+
1  q
2
qB +
1  q
2
C) + (1  q)q2B],
where C  1 q
2
G+ q 1+q
2
+ q 1 q
2
A+ 1 q
2
qB.
It can be veried that
sgn(G(4) G(5)) = sgn(q2(A+B   1) + 31  q
2
(1 G)  1 + q
2
).
When q = 1 or 1
3
,
A = B = G = 1 or
1
3
) q2(A+B   1) + 31  q
2
(1 G)  1 + q
2
= 0;
Meanwhile, q2(A+B   1) + 31 q
2
(1 G)  1+q
2
is in fact convex in q on (1
3
; 1), therefore
q2(A+B   1) + 31  q
2
(1 G)  1 + q
2
> 0 and G(4) > G(5).
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3 Learning and Price Dynamics in Durable Goods
Markets
A durable good provides a private use value to its user, and it is eventually resold in
a secondary market. This paper analyzes what determines di¤erent learning and price
dynamics in durable goods markets. Our model includes three main features: (i) buyers
have heterogeneous private use values and a common expected resale horizon; (ii) an
unobservable and time-varying aggregate state determines the distribution of use values
in the population; and (iii) trade takes place in markets with a limited number of buyers.
Informational frictions slow down learning and a¤ect price movements asymmetrically in
high and low aggregate states. We disentangle two sources of price variability. Idiosyn-
cratic volatility is prevalent in markets with very heterogenous use values, a long resale
horizon and a small number of buyers. Aggregate volatility mirrors the sensitivity of
prices to new price information, and it weights more when the resale motive dominates,
i.e., for goods with short resale horizons, signicant persistence of the aggregate state,
and similar use values.
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3.1 Introduction
Since the initial contribution of Hayek (1945), a vast literature in economic theory has
been studying how the price system aggregates dispersed private information. No social
planner has access to all available information, and in a market-based economy prices
have the fundamental of inuencing decisions by consumers, rms and governments. How
information is incorporated into asset prices is the main focus of the Rational Expectation
literature, and one of the most debated topics in nance.
Although there is a vast asset pricing literature on nancial securities, less attention
has been devoted to price patterns in durable goods markets. Notable examples are real-
estate, machineries, automotive, but also artwork, collectibles and musical instruments.
These goods provide a private use value to users, but they are often resold on the market
after some time. Durable goods represent a sizeable portion of household and corporate
balance sheets, and as such they play a central role in the economy as consumption goods,
production inputs or pledgeable collateral. Many papers focus on a specic market
especially real-estate and vehicles and try to match a few empirical facts, either with
a rather specic model, or with a slight adaptation of a workhorse asset pricing model.
In the former case, the results cannot be applied sic et simpliciter to other markets that
share few similarities; in the second case, models overlook some specic but potentially
relevant market features.67
In this paper we broadly focus on durable goods a su¢ ciently large class of assets
and we study how a few common characteristics a¤ect learning and information aggrega-
tion. Our model does not pretend to match precise price patterns for a specic market,
but it rather aims to highlight a few economic mechanisms common to all durable goods
markets.68
We develop a dynamic trading model with time-varying and unobservable aggregate
demand conditions. Our framework explicitly considers two peculiar characteristics of
durable goods. First, they trade in decentralized markets where sellers enter into private
67An example of this dihcotomic approach is the real estate literature. Some authors use Lucas-type
models and derive estimates for risk and liquidity premia, other papers set up search and matching
models including a rental sector, geographic dispersion, and private use values.
68We do not deal with any specic price puzzle, and we actually exclude a priori the existence of risk
premia by assuming agentsrisk neutrality. Our main focus is on information.
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negotiations with a limited number of potential buyers. Second, they provide utility as
consumption goods until re-sold to a di¤erent user at a future point in time.69 There
exist great variation within each characteristic. On the one hand, trade decentralization
admits a large variety of trade protocols. On the other hand, the consumption vs. resale
trade-o¤ depends on several intrinsic characteristics of the market.
Learning patterns depend on prices if the latter provide useful information on the
underlying aggregate demand. Heterogeneity in trading protocols leads to di¤erent ways
in which agents update their beliefs. These informational frictions may have di¤erent
origins: the absence of an organized trading platform, legal restrictions on information
disclosure, or bidders incentives to manipulate prices. We abstract from any single
source of friction and focus directly on the relationship between disclosed information
and learning dynamics. We present two main results. First, trading games revealing
coarser information sets lead to a slower learning process. Second, di¤erent trading
protocols may a¤ect beliefs asymmetrically between high and low aggregate demand
states. In particular, when only winning bids are disclosed, beliefs tend to adjust more
rapidly when the aggregate state is low.
If the trading protocol determines which information is revealed to agents, other
intrinsic characteristics of the durable good inuence its price sensitivity to new informa-
tion. We consider three main dimensions: the expected resale horizon, the persistence of
aggregate demand states, and the degree of heterogeneity in private use values. To ex-
plicitly solve the model, we assume sellers trade via second-price auctions. Thanks to an
analytic solution for the bidding strategy, we obtain several comparative statics results.
First, prices respond more to new information when buyers have more similar private
use values. Second, a longer expected resale horizon increases the relative importance
of private use values vis-á-vis future resale prices. Similarly, price sensitivity is larger
when aggregate states are more persistent. Lastly, price volatility can be decomposed
into two factors: idiosyncratic and aggregate. The former depends on the heterogeneity
in buyersuse values, and it is driven by the consumption motive. The latter captures
price sensitiveness to current information, and it depends on the interest in forecasting
69Other products may share the same two features. We explicitly refer to durable goods just to focus
our attention on a relevant set of markets which possess these broad characteristics.
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future prices.
Despite theoretical in nature, we believe our paper points out a few general ideas with
a broad range of potential applications. For example, suppose a credit o¢ cer has to decide
on the loan terms applied to two otherwise identical customers with di¤erent collateral
goods: one has an classic car, and the other one a modern corporate car. Which car is the
less risky collateral? To answer this question, it might be a good idea to understand who
participates in these markets, and for what purpose. Classic cars are mostly bought for
their subjective use value, and usually resold after a long time. On the contrary, buyers
of corporate cars have similar use values and a fast car turnover, and they signicantly
care about the future resale price. Our model provides a framework to explain how these
di¤erent characteristics a¤ect price volatility.
Overview of the model and results. We briey sketch our model setup to discuss
our results in more detail. Trade takes place through a sequence of trading rounds with
N bidders. Aggregate market conditions in period t depend on the distribution of private
values from which individual bidders are sampled. In particular, their per-period use
value in period t come from one of two possible distribution functions Ft , t 2 fH;Lg.
The state of the world t is never publicly revealed, and it varies overtime according to a
Markov process with state persistence j, j = H;L. Unless t realizations are independent
overtime, the observable public history provides information on the likelihood of future
states of the world. Private use values have a double role: (i) they measure individual
benets from enjoying the good; and (ii) they provide information on the underlying state
of the world. A winning bidder resells his good at a future random time: he faces an
  1 probability to sell his good in the next period. Higher values of  denote shorter
resale horizons.70 An owner enjoys his individual use value until resale. For simplicity,
losing bidders and sellers go out of the market with no future possibility of re-entering.
The aggregate state t may be considered as a reduced form to capture all those
elements such as fashion, business and credit cycles that a¤ect, at a given point in time,
the willingness to purchase the good among agents in the population. It is often di¢ cult
to directly observe this state and we assume buyers only observe previous transaction
70 could be interpreted as the likelihood of being hit by a liquidity shock that forces the owner to sell
the object.
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prices. For example, a real-estate buyer may collect information on past prices in a local
market but he may not have (or be able to process) information on unsuccessful bids, or
on the real-estate market at large.
Our setup captures a few characteristics of market demand that widely vary across
durable goods. The parameter  is a reduced form to capture the expected resale horizon
for the good. The state persistence parameter  measures how likely an aggregate state
will persist in future periods; lower values of H and L denote a more volatile aggregate
environment. The distributions F describe a more or less dispersed distribution of private
use values among agents in the economy. Finally, the number of bidders N provides a
measure of market competition, but also, to a certain extent, market liquidity. Thanks
to an explicit characterization of the bidding function it is possible to derive analytically
some general comparative statics results, and it would be straightforward to simulate
other statistical properties for specic functional forms F.
In Section 3.2 we discuss how di¤erences in the information revealed through prices
a¤ect learning dynamics. The more information is disclosed by a trade protocol, the
faster beliefs converge to the true state. In this respect, durable goods markets may
exhibit a more sluggish price adjustment process relative to a centralized market.71 The
second result is less intuitive. In general, the speed of learning di¤er between high and
low aggregate states. This asymmetry depends on the information revealed by the trade
protocol. For example, a rst-price auction reveals the highest valuation among the N
bidders. In this case, learning is faster in the low state because low prices are more
informative in revealing the underlying aggregate demand state.72
In Section 3.3 we assume for reasons of analytical tractability that the object is sold
in a sequence of second-price auctions.73 Prices are more sensitive to new information
in markets in which: (i) the resale horizon is shorter ( "); (ii) the expected demand
between high and low aggregate states is larger; (iii) the current state of market demand
is more likely to last longer (j "). Under these circumstances, sellers weight more the
71For example, in a modern stock exchange dealersprice quotes and traderslimit orders can be freely
observed in real time by all market participants. Without strategic price manipulation markets disclose
all private information.
72An analogous, but opposite, logic would hold if the lowest valuation among N bidders were revealed.
73In a second-price auction, players do not engage in strategic price manipulation: the optimal bidding
strategy truthfully reveals private signals. In other auction formats such as the rst-price auction
manipulative incentives may arise, and the equilibrium analysis becomes analytically intractable.
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informational content of recent prices, which is more e¤ective in predicting future resale
values. Price variability can be decomposed into two di¤erent components. The rst one
reects the heterogeneity in private use values, and it has a purely idiosyncratic nature.
The second type of uncertainty is over future market conditions. A decrease in the resale
horizon ( ") increases the aggregate variability component, decreasing the idiosyncratic
one; thus, the overall e¤ect is ambiguous. An increase in state persistence (j ") does not
a¤ect the idiosyncratic variance, and it increases the variability due to the future resale
component.
Related literature. This work is closely related to the literature on learning in
asset pricing models; see Timmermann (1993) for an early reference. This strand of
literature argues that learning may explain some classic asset pricing puzzles (equity
premium, risk-free rate and excess-volatility). Weitzman (2007) considers a Bayesian
framework with risk-averse preferences, while Ju and Miao (2012) introduce ambiguity
aversion as an additional explanatory factor. Compared to this literature, we focus more
on the di¤erent microeconomic determinants of price dynamics, and we abstract from
any discussion on risk premia by assuming risk neutral preferences.
This work is also related to the literature on auctions with resale. A small number of
papers study this topic in a two-period setting. Gupta and Lebrun (1999) consider a setup
in which private values are publicly revealed in the second period. Haile (2001, 2003)
study the revenue performance of di¤erent auction formats in a symmetric environment.
In his model, biddersinitial types come from the same initial distribution but they are not
publicly announced in the second period. Within a similar symmetric environment, Zheng
(2002) and Lebrun (2012) provide conditions to obtain the optimal auction outcomes rst
derived in Myerson (1981).74 Di¤erently from this literature, we do not assume that the
same set of bidders re-trades in future periods. The latter case is important for industries
in which market players rarely change overtime, and manipulative incentives may arise
when the same goods are re-traded among the same set of bidders.75 However, in many
durable goods markets this type of strategic interaction seems less relevant. For example,
74Lebrun (2012) extend the results in Zheng (2002) for the symmetric environment, and it provides
results for a specic class of asymmetric environments. Garratt and Tröger (2006), Halar and Krishna
(2008) and Virag (2013) provide additional results for asymmetric environments.
75For example, government concessions in telecommunications, oil, electricity.
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in the real-estate market, buyers and sellers often do not have any previous information
on the identity of their counterpart.76
The next section discusses some general results on public/social learning. Section 3:3
presents and solves the dynamic auction model, and provides some comparative statics
analysis. Section 3:4 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
3.2 Information Revelation and Learning
3.2.1 Model Setup
We consider a sequential market for a durable object. Time is discrete t 2 f0; 1; 2; : : :g.
In each period t, there is an underlying state t 2 fH;Lg. The stochastic process ftg1t=0
is a homogenous Markov process with transition matrix:
P =
24 H 1  H
1  L L
35
with 0  H ; L  1. The prior on t is denoted by t = (t; 1 t) with t  P(t = H).
There is a population of innitely many agents interested in the object. When an
object is o¤ered on sale, N  2 agents are randomly drawn from the population to
enter the market. Each buyer attaches a private use value to the object. The private
values generated in each period t, fvitgNi=1, are i.i.d. distributed according to a cumulative
density function (cdf) Ft across the N agents. The realizations of ftg1t=0 are not known
to the agents, but both P and 0 are common knowledge.
Both FH and FL are continuously di¤erentiable on the common support [0; 1]. More-
over, the corresponding probability density function (pdf) fH and fL are strictly positive
everywhere on [0; 1], and satisfy the monotone likelihood ratio (MLR) property: fH()
fL() is
strictly monotone on [0; 1].
76Similar to our model, in some Australian cities a signicant portion of home sales take place via auc-
tions: www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-04-23/australia-turns-to-auctions-as-housing-revives
-mortgages.html
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3.2.2 Public Beliefs Dynamics
The information revealed in a trading round depends on the trade protocol. For example,
there is a substantial di¤erence between auctions and centralized exchanges, but there
are also signicant di¤erences among auction formats. In this subsection, we abstract
from a specic trade protocol, and we directly consider the information revealed after a
trading round.77
Consider a vector Xk = fv1;k; :::; vN;kg of private signals dispersed among N traders.
We assume the trade protocol leads to publicly observe a statistic T (Xk). T () is assumed
not to depend on the previous history of the game, hence it is invariant in all periods
k. In other words, the statistic T captures which information in the vector of private
valuations Xk possessed by the N bidders in period k is publicly revealed after trade.78
It is an equilibrium object because it depends on the trade protocol and playersstrategies.
It implicitly incorporates both informational constraints, due to the market organization,
and informational frictions, due to playersstrategic behaviour.
We explore two di¤erent issues related to learning. First, we provide a su¢ cient
condition that ranks which statistic leads to a faster public belief convergence towards
the true state. Second, we analyze whether a particular T leads to a more rapid price
adjustment in one of the two states of the world. For these purposes, we restrict attention
to the full persistence case H = L = 1.
Consider a probability space hRN ;B; i endowed with the standard Borel -algebra
and Lebesgue probability measure. Let a measurable function Ti : RN ! RM ,M  N be
an observable statistic of the underlyingXk = fv1;k; :::vN;kg and let (Ti) be the -algebra
generated by Ti. We denote with SX the support of X.
Denition 3.1 Tj is coarser than Ti if (Tj)(Ti) and 9A2(Ti) s.t. A =2(Tj) and
(A)> 0.
For a statistic T let ST denote its support and CT (A) 
S
y2A

X 2 RN : T (X) = y	
the set of counter images of A  ST .
77In Section 3.3, we solve a specic model where agents participate in second-price auctions. In this
section, we adopt a more general approach to point out a few general properties of learning dynamics.
78For example, in Section 3.3 the second-highest price is publicly revealed and in equilibrium buyers
infer the corresponding private value, hence T (Xk) = v
(2;N)
k .
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We use this general notation to express public belief dynamics under di¤erent trade
protocols. Let fT (y) be the probability density function of statistic T under state  2
fH;Lg. Formally,
fT (y) =
Z
CT (y)
fX (x) d(x)
It is easier to describe the evolution of public beliefs with the log-likelihood ratio:
lk+1(lk; yk) = ln
+1
1  +1 = ln

1  
fTH(yk)
fTL (yk)
= lk + ln
fTH(yk)
fTL (yk)
(1)
where yk = T (xk) is the value of statistic T when the vector of private use values for the
N bidders in period k is xk 2 RN . To stress that the log-likelihood lk depends on T ,
we add a superscript T . Let lTk+1(yk) = l
T
k+1(l
T
k ; yk)   lTk = ln f
T
H(yk)
fTL (yk)
denote the change
in the log-likelihood ratio from period k to k + 1 under statistic T . Assume there exists
M > 0 such that jlT (x)j < M for every x 2 SX .
For q  1 equation (1) generalizes into:
lTk+q = l
T
k +
qX
m=1
lTk+m(yk+m 1)
Taking the expected value:
EXk;[lTk+q] = lTk +
qX
m=1
EXk;

lTk+m(T (xk+m 1))

= lTk + qEX

lT (T (x))

The last equation exploits the fact that conditional on  samples are i.i.d. in all peri-
ods. In the remainder of the paper, we simply use E

lT

rather than EX

lT (T (x))

.
Beliefs converge to the true state as EH

lT

> 0 > EL

lT

.79 Moreover, for two
di¤erent statistics T1 and T2, public beliefs are expected to converge more rapidly to the
true state  under statistic T1 if
E lT1 > E lT2 (2)
79These inequalities follow from a simple application of Gibbsinequality. They are strict inequalities
because of the MLR assumption earlier.
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The following claim provides an intuitive but still insightful result. If two statistics
can be ranked according to Denition 3.1, it is possible to conclude that convergence is
slower for the coarser one.
Claim 3.2.1 If T2 is coarser than T1 then equation (2) holds.
Although the result in Claim 3.2.1 is not surprising, it highlights an important prop-
erty of markets in which information is only partially revealed. More severe informational
frictions lead to more sluggish trade dynamics, and, possibly, a slower price adjustment.
A less intuitive result is that trade protocols may create di¤erences between high
and low states in the speed of convergence of public beliefs. In turn, more rapid learning
is likely to be positively correlated with a more rapid price adjustment.
Claim 3.2.2 Consider a statistic T (), and let 0 = 1=2. Dene:
H  inf fk  0 : k  1  g L  inf fk  0 : k  g
Then:
lim
"!0
EH [H ]
EL[L]

 EL[lT ]EH [lT ]  > 1 if EH [lT ] + EL[lT ] < 0;
lim
"!0
EL[L]
EH [H ]

EH [lT ]EL[lT ]  > 1 if EH [lT ] + EL[lT ] > 0.
Claim 3.2.2 points out a learning story based on the nature of the information revealed
in previous trading rounds. Compared to the rockets and feathersstory, our mechanism
is likely to run the opposite way. If a trade protocol only reveals winning bids, a more
rapid adjustment should be observed downward. We discuss the intuition in the context
of an example.
Example of Claim 3.2.2. Consider pdfs fH(x) = 2x and fL(x) = 2(1 x). Suppose
the trade protocol reveals, in equilibrium, the j-th order statistic out of N bidders. The
next table summarizes the numerical values of the critical expression EH [lT ] +EL[lT ]
in Claim 3.2.2:80
80We compute it numerically as explicit integrals cannot be obtained.
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N jj 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 0
2  0:09 0:09
3  0:22 0 0:22
4  0:37  0:13 0:13 0:37
5  0:52  0:28 0 0:28 0:52
6  0:68  0:44  0:14 0:14 0:44 0:68
7  0:83  0:60  0:30 0 0:30 0:60 0:83
8  0:99  0:77  0:46  0:15 0:15 0:46 0:77 0:99
9  1:14  0:94  0:63  0:31 0 0:31 0:63 0:94 1:14
10  1:29  1:12  0:80  0:48  0:16 0:16 0:48 0:80 1:12 1:29
The value is negative (positive) when beliefs move more rapidly toward state L (H),
as the expecting hitting time under state L (H) is shorter. The table shows that:
1. If j < N+1
2
convergence is faster towards state L.
2. If j > N+1
2
convergence is faster towards state H.
3. If j = N+1
2
, (N odd), there is no di¤erence.
The table captures an intuitive result. If the trade protocol reveals a sequence of
higher order statistic (j < N+1
2
), low-value observations are more informative than high-
value ones, and learning in more rapid in state L.81 Fixing j and increasing the sample
size N , there is more and more asymmetry toward state L.82 Increasing the sample
size N , the j-th order statistic is relatively higher, low-value observations become more
informative, and there is a greater asymmetry towards state L. For example, if only the
winning bid is revealed, low demand states are learnt more rapidly in a large market.
In conclusion, prices are not equally informative on both aggregate states. This phe-
nomenon depends on the original distribution functions F, but also on the trading pro-
tocol, and the number of market participants.
81On the contrary, if a sequence of lower order statistic (j > N+12 ) is revealed, high-value observations
are more informative than low-value ones, and learning is more rapid in state H.
82Alternatively, there is less asymmetry towards H as values get smaller downwards in each column.
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3.3 Dynamic Auction Model
3.3.1 Trading Protocol
Consider the model setup in Subsection 3.2.1. Now assume agents trade in second-price
auctions according to the following protocol.
1. Consider a stochastic sequence ftkg1k=0, with t0 normalized to 0. At each tk, N new
agents enter the market, and participate in a sealed-bid second-price auction. The
winner of the auction at tk is the seller in the next available auction at tk+1.
2. The waiting time between tk+1 and tk is a random variable, which is i.i.d distributed
across k according to a geometric distribution with parameter  2 (0; 1]. That is,
P(4k  tk+1   tk = x) = (1  )x 1, 8x 2 N+, 8k 2 N.
Due to the i.i.d. feature of the waiting time, we simply call the auction at tk as
auction k. We also label each bidder in auction k by ik, i 2 f1; 2; : : : ; Ng. Denote
his private value and bid as wik  vi;tk and bik, respectively.
3. The winner of auction k resells the object at the next available auction k + 1. The
revenues from resale are discounted at rate  per period. Meanwhile, he enjoys
his private value of the object, wik, in every period before auction k + 1, and he
discounts his utility at rate  per period.
4. The trading price pk  b(2)k , the second highest bid in auction k, is publicly ob-
served by the whole population before the next auction starts. There is no in-
formation generated between two adjacent auctions, other than the realization of
the waiting time in between. Hence, the information set for each bidder ik is
Iik = fwik; fpg<k; fg<kg.
3.3.2 Equilibrium characterization
Let b  fbikgiN;k2N denote the action prole of all market entrants and every bidder
iks payo¤ is given by
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uik(b;wik) = 1fbik=b(1)k g
 f b(2)k +
4k 1X
s=0
swik + 
kb
(2)
k+1g
Denote the public belief about the underlying state  before auction k by k =
(k; 1  k) with k  P(tk = Hjfpg<k).
We consider a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium with symmetric, time-invariant and
monotone strategies. In turn, every bidder ik can restrict his attention to the infor-
mation set fvik, kg.
Denition 3.2 A pure strategy prole b  fbik(Iik)giN;k2N is a perfect Bayesian equi-
librium with symmetric, time-invariant and monotone strategies if
1. bik(Iik) = b(wik;k), 8i; t;
2. @b
(wik;k)
@wik
> 0, 8wik 2 [0; 1];
3. b(wik;k) = arg max
b
E[uik(b; b ik;wik)jwik;k], 8i; k;
4. k+1 =

kgH(b
 1(pk;k))
kgH(b 1(pk;k))+(1 k)gL(b 1(pk;k)) ;
(1 k)gL(b 1(pk;k))
kgH(b 1(pk;k))+(1 k)gL(b 1(pk;k))

Pk
where g() is the pdf of the 2nd order statistic among N i.i.d random variables
distributed according to F, 8 2 fH;Lg.
The next proposition provides an explicit characterization of the equilibrium.
Proposition 3.3.1 Let H + L  1. There is a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium
with symmetric, time-invariant and monotone strategies:
b(wik; k) = 11 +
n
wik +

1 
h
cL +
1 L
1 (H+L 1)c
i
+ ik
(H+L 1)
1 (H+L 1)c
o
with
1.
ik 
kfH(wik)hH(wik)
kfH(wik)hH(wik) + (1  k)fL(wik)hL(wik)
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where h() is the pdf of the 1st order statistic among N   1 i.i.d random variables
distributed according to F, 8 2 fH;Lg;
2. c 
R 1
0
xg(x) dx, 8 2 fH;Lg, and c  cH   cL.
The equilibrium bidding function b(wik; k) can be decomposed in a private value
(PV) and a resale value (RV) component.
PV = wik
1 +
RV = 
1 +
h

1 

cL +
1 L
1 (H+L 1)c

+ ik
(H+L 1)
1 (H+L 1)c
i
The private value component is the expected discounted use value of the good until
resale takes place. An increase in the expected resale horizon ( #) increases the private
value component but decreases the resale value component. Bidders expect to enjoy
the good for a longer time, so their use value gains importance relative to the expected
future resale price. The resale value component includes a constant term, and another
term which depends on belief ik. The latter depends on the public belief k, and on the
private use value wik. The random variable wik enters in two distinct updating. First,
wik is a signal on the current state of the world because it comes from the common
distribution F. Second, in equilibrium a winning bidder realizes that all other N   1
bidders had lower private use values. This last updating is analogous to the inference
carried out by a winning bidder in a static common value auction. In this respect, our
model may o¤er a dynamic micro-foundation of a static common value auction. The
future resale price is at the root of the interdependence among biddersvaluations.
3.3.3 Comparative statics
In this subsection we carry out a few comparative statics exercises to highlight the main
determinants of di¤erent price dynamics.
The sensitiveness of b(wik; k) with respect to  can be measured through a simple
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elasticity measure:
b :=

b
@b
@
=
 (H+L 1)
1 (H+L 1)c
wik +

1 
h
cL +
1 L
1 (H+L 1)c
i
+  (H+L 1)
1 (H+L 1)c
A higher value of b denotes a greater sensitivity of biddersstrategies to their present
beliefs about the state of the world. It is easy to show that b is increasing in , c and
j, j = H;L. In words, the bidding strategy is more sensitive to new information if: (i)
the resale horizon is shorter ( "); (ii) the expected di¤erence between aggregates states is
larger (c ");83 or (iii) each state is more persistent (j "). The intuition for each variable
is pretty straightforward. When the resale horizon is shorter, present information is more
accurate to predict the state of the world at the future time of resale. Similarly, when
states of the world are more persistent, current beliefs are more precise in predicting
future states. As a result, prices respond more to new information (Fig. 3). Finally, a
greater di¤erence c increases the variability in the possible resale values between the
two aggregate states, and agents adjust their bids more sharply.
Lastly, we derive a statistical measure of dispersion for realized prices. Our variance
measure is derived assuming a deterministic resale horizon, say, q periods long, and a
future state of the world k+1.84 Public beliefs move between any two trading periods
according to the law of motion in Denition 3.2, and for a given k and a xed resale
horizon q it is immediate to get the value of k+1.85
Three di¤erent factors contribute to price variability:
Var

b

w
(2)
k+1; k+1
k+1= 11 +2Var w(2)+ (H+L 1)1 (H+L 1)2Var w(2)k+1; k+1k+1
+ 2 (H+L 1)1 (H+L 1) cov

w
(2)
k+1; 

w
(2)
k+1; k+1
 k+1i
(3)
83Specically it is the di¤erence in the expected second highest use value out of N bidders between
the high and low state of the world.
84Notice the di¤erence with the variance computed according to the subjective belief of a bidders in
auction k. In this case, bidders do not know neither the present nor the future state.
85If we did not condition on a xed resale horizon, we could have alternatively computed a measure
of expected variance using as weights the probability to resale in a given future period.
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Simulation with N = 4,  = 0:9,  = 0:6, 0 = 0:5. The persistent line refers to
H = L = 0:9 while the volatile one to H = L = 0:55. Private values wik are randomly
sampled from lognormal distributions with mean H = 8, L = 4 and variance  = 2.
Figure 3: Di¤erence in state persistence.
The rst term Var
 
w(2)

captures the heterogeneity in private use values. This
idiosyncratic component depends on the initial distribution F, and on the number of
bidders N . A higher dispersion in subjective use values increases this quantity. The e¤ect
of an increase in N is not obvious, and it depends on the specic F() (see Papadatos
(1995)). The second term in equation (3) reects the uncertainty over the future beliefs
held by the second highest bidder in auction k + 1. It is a product of two quantities:
a multiplicative constant, and the variance of k+1 conditional on k+1. The former is
increasing in  and j; the latter is a complex quantity to analyze without additional
assumptions on the functional forms for the pdfs. Lastly, the third term captures bidders
updating of ik with the private use value wi;k+1. The latter is used as an informative
signal on the underlying aggregate state. The covariance term is always positive and
it further increases price variability. The last two terms in equation (3) represent the
volatility due to the uncertainty over future market conditions.
A decrease in the resale horizon ( ") increases aggregate variability, decreasing the
idiosyncratic one. The overall e¤ect is ambiguous. A increase in the state persistence
(j ") does not a¤ect idiosyncratic variance, but it increases the aggregate one. Unfor-
tunately, it is di¢ cult to derive additional comparative statics results without assuming
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a specic distribution. Nonetheless, thanks to Proposition 3.3.1, it is straightforward to
simulate any quantity of interest once we assume a specic form for F.
3.4 Conclusion
This paper proposes a model for durable goods markets. We explicitly consider the
possibility to re-sell an object, and we discuss what the potential implications are for
learning and price dynamics.
We rst present two results on the dynamics of public beliefs. First, the ner is the
information publicly revealed in equilibrium, the faster is the convergence of public beliefs
to the true state of the world. Second, trade protocols may lead public beliefs to move
upward or downward at di¤erent rates. In particular, if only winning bids are disclosed,
beliefs tend to adjust more rapidly when aggregate demand is low.
In the second part of the paper, we consider a dynamic auction model. Thanks to
an analytic characterization of the bidding strategy, we provide some comparative statics
results. A longer expected resale horizon increases the importance of private use values,
and prices are less sensitive to current information. In this case, price volatility is mainly
driven by the idiosyncratic tastes of users. If states of the world tend to last longer, prices
respond more to current information. This is also the case when the di¤erence in market
conditions between high and low states is large.
This paper assumes an exogenous resale decision which is independent from previous
price dynamics. This is clearly a strong assumption. Endogenous resale decisions play a
decisive role in shaping market dynamics. For example, there is strong empirical evidence
on the positive correlation between volume and prices in the real-estate market. Solving
a dynamic auction model with endogenous entry is a challenging direction of extension,
and we hope to address it in the future.
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3.5 Appendix
Proof of Claim 3.2.1. We prove the statement only for  = H as an analogous
arguments holds for  = L.86 Equation (2) can be easily rewritten as
EXH

ln
fT1L f
T2
H
fT1H f
T2
L

< 0.
Jensens inequality implies
EXH

ln
fT1L f
T2
H
fT1H f
T2
L

 lnEXH

fT1L f
T2
H
fT1H f
T2
L

Notice
EXH

fT1L f
T2
H
fT1H f
T2
L

=
Z
SX
fT1L (T1(x))f
T2
H (T2(x))
fT1H (T1(x))f
T2
L (T2(x))
fXH (x) d(x)
=
Z
ST1
Z
CT1(y)
fT1L (T1(x))f
T2
H (T2(x))
fT1H (T1(x))f
T2
L (T2(x))
fXH (x) d(x)d(y)
For every y 2 ST1 the function f
T1
L (T1(x))f
T2
H (T2(x))
f
T1
H (T1(x))f
T2
L (T2(x))
is constant for every element in CT1(y).
For f
T1
L
f
T1
H
this is true by denition of CT1 , while it follows from coarseness for f
T2
H
f
T2
L
. Then,
Z
ST1
Z
CT1 (y)
fT1L (T1(x))f
T2
H (T2(x))
fT1H (T1(x))f
T2
L (T2(x))
fXH (x) d(x)d(y)
=
Z
ST1
fT1L (y)f
T2
H (y)
fT1H (y)f
T2
L (y)
fT1H (y) d(y) =
Z
ST1
fT2H (y)
fT2L (y)
fT1L (y) d(y)
86This proof uses coarseness in order to reduce the expression to a standard Gibbsinequality.
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As (T2)  (T1) we can rewrite fT2 (z) =
R
y2ST1 :T2(CT1 (y))=z
fT1 (y)d(y). Therefore:
Z
ST1
fT2H (y)
fT2L (y)
fT1L (y) d(y) =
Z
ST2
fT2H (z)
fT2L (z)
Z
y2ST1 :T2(CT1 (y))=z
fT1L (y)d(y)d(z)
=
Z
ST2
fT2H (z)
fT2L (z)
fT2L (z)d(z) = 1
As a result lnEXH

f
T1
L f
T2
H
f
T1
H f
T2
L

= ln 1 = 0.
Finally observe that Jensens inequality holds strictly. In fact, ln is a strictly concave
function and f
T1
L f
T2
H
f
T1
H f
T2
L
is not constant almost everywhere because coarseness implies the
existence at least two sets A;B s.t. A  B, A =2 (T2) and (A) > 0 where T2(x) is
constant 8x 2 B while T1(x) 6= T1(x0) for x 2 A and x0 2 BnA.
Proof of Claim 3.2.2. As 0 = 12 we have l
T
k =
Pk 1
i=0 l
T
i+1 where l
T
i+1 = l
T
i+1   lTi =
ln
fTH(yi)
fTL (yi)
i = 0; 1; :::; k is a sequence of i.i.d. random variables.
Hitting times H and L can be equivalently stated in terms lk:
 lH := inf

k > 0 : lTk  ln
1  


 lL := inf

k > 0 : lTk  ln

1  

Applying Wald (1944)s lemma to the sequence of i.i.d random variables li:
E[lT l ] = E[
l
]E[lT ] 8 2 fH;Lg (4)
By Gibbsinequality EH [lT ] > 0 and EL[lT ] < 0. If EH [lT ] + EL[lT ] < 0 then
EL[lT ] =  
 
EH [lT ] + c

where c    R
ST
ln
fTH(y)
fTL (y)
 
fTH(y) + f
T
L (y)

d(y) > 0. Note that c only depends on the
primitives and it is independent of ".
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Substituting in equation (4):
EH [ lH ]EH [lT ] = EH [lT lH ]
EL[ lL](EH [lT ] + c) =  EL[lT lL ]
Hence
EH [lT ](EH [ lH ]  EL[ lL]) = EH [lT lH ] + EL[l
T
 lL
] + EL[ lL]c
=) EH [lT ]

EH [ lH ]
EL[ lL]
  1

=
EH [lT
l
H
]+EL[lT
l
L
]
EL[ lL]
+ c
Note that jlT j < M implies EL[lT lL ]  ln
"
1 "  M and by denition EH [lT lH ]  ln
1 "
"
,
hence
EH [lT ](
EH [ lH ]
EL[ lL]
  1)   M
EL[ lL]
+ c
On the other hand, by Walds lemma,
EL[ lL] =
EL[lT lL ]
EL[lT ]
 ln
1 "
"
M
> 0
so
EH [lT ](
EH [ lH ]
EL[ lL]
  1)    M
2
ln 1 "
"
+ c
Since 0 < EH [lT ] < M ,
EH [ lH ]
EL[ lL]
  1 >   M
ln 1 "
"
+ cEH [lT ]
=   M
ln 1 "
"
+  EH [l
T ] EL[lT ]
EH [lT ]
=   M
ln 1 "
"
  1 +
 EL[lT ]EH [lT ] as EL[lT ] < 0.
Note that ln 1 "
"
! 1 as " ! 0, hence 8 > 0, 9" > 0 such that 8" < ", M
ln 1 "
"
< .
The proof for the other case is symmetric.
Proof of Proposition 3.3.1. Consider the subgame starting from auction k.
Note thatk is statistically independent of the underlying state and all private values,
hence we can integrate it out when calculating the expected payo¤ of bidder ik:
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E[uik(b; b ik;wik)jwik;k]
= P(b(2)k < bjwik;k)
n
 E(b(2)k jwik;k)
+
1X
x=1
(1  )x 1
"
x 1X
s=0
swik + 
xE(b(2)k+1jwik;k;k = x)
#)
= P(b(2)k < bjwik;k)
(
 E(b(2)k jwik;k) +
1X
x=1
(1  )x 1 1  
x
1   wik
+
1X
x=1


1  (   )
x E(b(2)k+1jwik;k;k = x)
)
= P(tk = Hjwik;k)P(b(2)k < bjtk = H)
n
 E(b(2)k jtk = H) + wik
+
1X
x=1


1  (   )
xE(b
(2)
k+1jtk = H;k = x)
)
+ P(tk = Ljwik;k)P(b(2)k < bjtk = L)
n
 E(b(2)k jtk = L) + wik
+
1X
x=1


1  (   )
x E(b(2)k+1jtk = L;k = x)
)
For convenience, let us introduce the following notation:
zk  w(2)k  v(2)tk : 2nd highest realization of private values in auc-
tion k
xj  ((P x)j1; (P x)j2) the j-th row of matrix P x, j 2 f1; 2g, 8x 2 N+
ek+1  (eHk+1; eLk+1)| the expectation of equilibrium resale revenue
ek+1  E(b(2)k+1jtk+1 = ) conditional on the state of next auction
ek = (ek; 1  ek) the belief used by the 2nd-highest-value bidderek  kfH(zk)hH(zk)kfH(zk)hH(zk)+(1 t)fL(zk)hL(zk) of auction k in his bidding function.
Using the notations above, we have
E(b(2)k+1jtk = H;k = x) = x1ek+1;
E(b(2)k+1jtk = L;k = x) = x2ek+1.
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Assuming monotone and symmetric bidding strategy, we can rewrite bidder iks problem
as
max
b
ik
b 1(b;k)Z
0
"
 b(y;k) + wik +
1X
x=1

1  (   )
xx1ek+1
#
hH(y) dy
+ (1  ik)
b 1(b;k)Z
0
"
 b(y;k) + wik +
1X
x=1

1  (   )
xx2ek+1
#
hL(y) dy
where ik  P(tk = Hjwik;k) = kfH(wik)kfH(wik)+(1 k)fL(wik) , bidder iks posterior about
tk . Note that ek+1, the expected equilibrium resale revenue, will depend on x, the
realization of k, and y, the realization of zk, through public belief k+1, therefore it
cannot be taken out of the integral.
FOC yields
0 = ik
"
 b(wik;k) + wik +
1X
x=1

1  (   )
xx1ek+1
#
hH(wik)
+ (1  ik)
"
 b(wik;k) + wik +
1X
x=1

1  (   )
xx2ek+1
#
hL(wik)
Using it and B dened in the proposition we can rewrite the FOC as
b(wik;k) = wik + ik
" 1X
x=1

1  (   )
xP xek+1
#
= wik +
" 1X
x=1

1  (   )
x(ikP
x)ek+1
#
Now we need to solve for the equilibrium object ek+1.
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Since the bidding strategy is time-invariant,
ek+1  E(b(2)k+1
tk+1 = )
= E

b(zk+1;k+1(k; y = wik; x;P ))
tk+1 = 
= E
"
zk+1 +
1X
x0=1

1  (   )
x0(ek+1P x0)ek+2
tk+1 = 
#
Put it back into the bidding function above,
b(wik;k)
= wik +
" 1X
x=1

1  (   )
x(ikP
x)ek+1
#
= wik +
1X
x=1

1  (   )
x(ikP
x)

E[zk+1jtk+1 = H]
E[zk+1jtk+1 = L]

+
1X
x=1

1  (   )
x(ikP
x)
0BB@ E
 1P
x0=1

1 (   )x
0
(ek+1P x0)ek+2tk+1 = H
E
 1P
x0=1

1 (   )x
0
(ek+1P x0)ek+2tk+1 = L
1CCA
= wik + 
1X
x=1

1  (   )
xEik[zk+1]
+
1X
x=1

1  (   )
xEik
" 1X
x0=1

1  (   )
x0(ek+1P x0)ek+2
#
where Eik[] denote the expectation of bidder ik conditional on the event that he wins
auction k and the highest value among others is exactly equal to his value, and his waiting
time for resale is x.
Now consider ek+2. Let us label the 2nd highest bidder in auction k as bidder ek,
8k 2 N.
ek+2  E
h
b
(2)
k+2
tk+2 = i
= E

b(zk+2;k+2(k+1; y = zk+1; x;P ))jtk+2 = 

= E
(
zk+2 +
1X
x00=1

1  (   )
x00(ek+2P x00)e+3tk+2 = 
)
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Hence
ek+1P x0 ek+2 = E]k+1[zk+2] + E]k+1
" 1X
x00=1

1  (   )
x00
ek+2P x00 ek+3
#
where E]k+1[] denote the expectation of bidder ]k + 1 conditional on the event that he
wins auction k + 1 and the highest value among others is exactly equal to his value, and
his waiting time for resale is x0.
Plugging back this value into the bidding function of bidder ik,
b(wik;k)
= wik + 
1X
x=1

1  (   )
xEik[zk+1]
+
1X
x=1

1  (   )
xEik
" 1X
x0=1

1  (   )
x0E]k+1[zk+2]
#
+ rik
= wik + 
1X
x=1

1  (   )
xEik[zk+1]
+ 
1X
x=1

1  (   )
x
" 1X
x0=1

1  (   )
x0Eik[zk+2]
#
+ rik
= wik + 
1X
x=1

1  (   )
xikP
xc
+ 
1X
x=1

1  (   )
x
" 1X
x0=1

1  (   )
x0ikP
x+x0c
#
+ rik
= wik + ik
" 1X
x=1

1  (   )
xP x
#
c+ ik
" 1X
x=1

1  (   )
xP x
#2
c+ rik
= wik + ikBc+ ikB
2c+ rik
The second equation comes from law of iterated expectation and the fourth equation
comes from the fact that waiting time is i.i.d. across auctions.
The residual term rik is:
1X
x=1

1  ( )
xEik
" 1X
x0=1

1  (   )
x0E]k+1
" 1X
x00=1

1  (   )
x00(ek+2P x00)ek+3
##
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Note that the expected present value of the resale revenue from auction k + m for
bidder ik goes to 0 as m goes to innity, due to the existence of discount rate . Hence we
can recursively solve for the bidding function following the argument above, and nally
get
b(wik;k) = wik + ik
 1X
s=1
Bs
!
c
= [wik + ikB(I  B) 1c]
To complete the proof, we need to verify that this is indeed a monotone bidding
function.
Let D =
24 d11 d12
d21 d22
35  B(I  B) 1 and rewrite b(wik;k) as
b(wik;k) = (wik + ikDc)
=  fwik + d21cH + d22cL + ik [(d11   d22 + d12   d21)cL + (d11   d21)c]g
where c  cH   cL > 0 and dij, i; j = 1; 2, to be determined.
The matrix B = P [I   (1  )P ] 1 is equal to:
B = 
24 H 1  H
1  L L
3524 1  (1  )H (1  )(1  H)
 (1  )(1  L) 1  (1  )L
35 1
=

(1  (1  ))(1  (1  )(H + L   1))
264 H   (1  )(H + L   1) 1  H
1  L L   (1  )(H + L   1)
375  
24 b11 b12
b21 b22
35
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Therefore
D
= B(I  B) 1 = 
24 b11 b12
b21 b22
3524 1  b11  b12
 b21 1  b22
35 1
=
1
(1  b11)(1  b22)  2b12b21 
24 b11(1  b22) + 2b12b21 b12
b21 b22(1  b11) + 2b12b21
35
Plugging back the value of  and bij; i; j = 1; 2 we have
(1  b11)(1  b22)  2b12b21 = (1 )(1 (H+L 1))(1 +)(1 (1 )(H+L 1)) ;
b11(1  b22) + 2b12b21 = (1 +))(1 (1 )(H+L 1))(H   (H + L   1));
b22(1  b11) + 2b12b21 = (1 +)(1 (1 )(H+L 1))(L   (H + L   1));
b12 =

(1 +)(1 (1 )(H+L 1))(1  H);
b21 =

(1 +)(1 (1 )(H+L 1))(1  L)
Therefore
D =

(1  )(1  (H + L   1))
24 H   (H + L   1) 1  H
1  L L   (H + L   1)
35
If we plug back the elements of D into the bidding function we get
b(wik;k) = 

wik +

1  

cL +
1  L
1  (H + L   1)
c

+ ik
(H + L   1)
1  (H + L   1)
c

Since H + L 2 [1; 2] and ik is strictly monotone in wik, b(wik;k) is clearly strictly
monotone in wik as well.
Lastly, notice that the b(wik;k) is indeed the unique solution to the FOC, which
implies that the expected payo¤ of each bidder would be a single-peaked function of her
bid, hence FOC is su¢ cient for optimality.
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